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2166 Results

The Macroeconomic Implications of Coholding

Staff working paper 2024-16 Michael Boutros, Andrej Mijakovic
Coholder households simultaneously carry high-cost credit card debt and low-yield cash. We study the implications of this behavior for fiscal and monetary policy, finding that coholder households have smaller consumption responses in the short run but larger responses in the long run.

The Welfare Effects of Protection: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Canada’s National Policy

Staff working paper 2017-18 Patrick Alexander, Ian Keay
In this paper, we study the impact of Canada’s adoption of protectionist trade policy in 1879 on Canadian welfare. Under the National Policy the Canadian average weighted tariff increased from 14% to 21%. The conventional view is that this was a distortionary policy that negatively affected Canadian welfare.

Global Demand and Supply Sentiment: Evidence from Earnings Calls

Staff working paper 2023-37 Temel Taskin, Franz Ulrich Ruch
This paper quantifies global demand, supply and uncertainty shocks and compares two major global recessions: the 2008–09 Great Recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. We use two alternate approaches to decompose economic shocks: text mining techniques on earnings calls transcripts and a structural Bayesian vector autoregression model.
August 4, 2010

Governor's Award

Annual research grants for a term of up to two years.

The Impact of a Trade War: Assessment of the Current Tariffs and Alternative Scenarios

Staff analytical note 2019-20 Karyne B. Charbonneau
This note uses Charbonneau and Landry’s (2018) framework to assess the direct impact of the current trade tensions on the Canadian and global economies, as well as possible implications if the conflict escalates further. Overall, my findings show that the estimated impact of current tariffs on real gross domestic product (GDP) remains relatively small, which is in line with the literature on gains from trade, but the impact on trade is much larger.

Did U.S. Consumers Respond to the 2014–2015 Oil Price Shock? Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey

Staff working paper 2018-13 Patrick Alexander, Louis Poirier
The impact of oil price shocks on the U.S. economy is a topic of considerable debate. In this paper, we examine the response of U.S. consumers to the 2014–2015 negative oil price shock using representative survey data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.

The impact of a central bank digital currency on payments at the point of sale

Staff analytical note 2024-27 Walter Engert, Oleksandr Shcherbakov, André Stenzel
We simulate the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and use of different payment methods. Modest frictions that deter consumer adoption of a CBDC inhibit its market penetration. Minor pricing responses by financial institutions and payment service providers further reduce the impact of a CBDC.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): C, C5, C51, D, D1, D12, E, E4, E42, L, L1, L14, L5, L52 Research Theme(s): Money and payments, Digital assets and fintech, Retail payments
December 10, 2007

Inflation Targeting, Price-Level Targeting, and Fluctuations in Canada's Terms of Trade

Coletti and Lalonde compare inflation targeting and price-level targeting in the context of a small open economy subject to sizable terms-of-trade shocks. The authors summarize recent research that compares the ability of price-level targeting and inflation targeting to stabilize the macroeconomy when confronted with shocks similar to those experienced by Canada in recent years. Their preliminary results suggest that price-level targeting may represent a feasible alternative to traditional inflation targeting. Their article also provides insight into the direction of current research in this area at the Bank.

Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion

Staff working paper 2019-10 Shota Ichihashi
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.
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