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We estimate a panel error correction model for loan loss provisions, using unique supervisory data on flow of funds into and out of the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks in the post-2008 crisis period. We find that these banks aim for an allowance of 49% of impaired loans.

In this analysis, we use simulations in the Bank of Canada’s projection model—the Terms-of-Trade Economic Model—to consider a suite of extended monetary policies to support the economy following the COVID-19 crisis.

Gosselin examines and reports on the various factors that contribute to successful inflation targeting. Using a panel of 21 inflation-targeting countries over the period 1990Q1-2007Q2, Gosselin finds that the ability of central banks to hit their targets varies considerably. Some of these differences can be explained by exchange rate fluctuations, fiscal deficits, and differences in financial development. Others are explained by differences in the targeting framework itself and the manner in which it is implemented.

This paper studies how the allocation of residual losses affects trading and welfare in a central counterparty. I compare loss sharing under two loss-allocation mechanisms – variation margin haircutting and cash calls – and study the privately and socially optimal degree of loss sharing.

In a virtual address to the Canadian Association for Business Economics, Deputy Governor Lawrence Schembri discusses the difference between how Canadians perceive inflation and the actual measured rate. He explains why that gap may exist and what it could mean for monetary policy and the economy.

This note estimates potential output growth for the global economy through 2019. While there is considerable uncertainty surrounding our estimates, overall we expect global potential output growth to rise modestly, from 3.1 per cent in 2016 to 3.4 per cent in 2019.

This paper attempts to borrow the tradition of estimating policy reaction functions in monetary policy literature and apply it to capital controls policy literature. Using a novel weekly dataset on capital controls policy actions in 21 emerging economies over the period 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2015, I examine the mercantilist and macroprudential motivations for capital control policies.

An anonymous token-based central bank digital currency (CBDC) would pose certain security risks to users. These risks arise from how balances are aggregated, from their transactional use and from the competition between suppliers of aggregation solutions.

Senior Deputy Governor Carolyn A. Wilkins discusses what the economy will need once we’re past the COVID-19 crisis.

We explore the implications of digitalization for monetary policy, both in terms of how monetary policy affects the economy and in terms of data analysis and communication with the public.