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The Great Recession and current pandemic have focused attention on the constraint on nominal interest rates from the effective lower bound.

During the recent financial crisis, one of the forces set in motion by the initial losses on subprime-mortgage loans was a significant decline in the market liquidity of assets and in the ability of financial institutions to obtain funding in wholesale markets. In this article, the authors summarize recent research that clarifies the role of liquidity in destabilizing the financial system and examine the implications of this research for the recently announced financial system reforms, including Basel III.

This paper documents the properties of Government of Canada securities in cash, repo and securities lending transactions over their life cycle. By tracking every security from issuance to maturity, we are able to highlight inter-linkages between the markets for cash and for specific securities.

We expect potential output growth to be higher than in the October 2020 reassessment. By 2024, growth will be slightly above its average growth from 2010 to 2019. We assess that the Canadian nominal neutral rate continues to lie in the range of 1.75 to 2.75 percent.

We expect global potential output growth to increase from 2.5% in 2022 to 2.8% by 2026. Compared with the April 2022 staff assessment, global potential output growth is marginally slower. The current range for the US neutral rate is 2% to 3%, unchanged from the last annual assessment.

The authors examine the liquidity and leverage characteristics of Canadian long-term, open-end mutual funds in terms of their potential systemic effects on the Canadian mutual fund sector and on the Canadian financial system more broadly. In their overall assessment of this sector, they consider the regulation, market size and ownership structure of mutual funds in Canada and provide observations about the industry globally.

This paper finds that debt-financed government spending multipliers vary considerably depending on the location of the debt buyer. In a sample of 33 countries, we find that government spending multipliers are larger when government purchases are financed by issuing debt to foreign investors (non-residents), compared with when government purchases are financed by issuing debt to home investors (residents).

We propose a new strength measure of the global financial cycle by estimating a regime-switching factor model on cross-border equity flows for 61 countries. We then assess how the strength of the global financial cycle affects monetary policy independence, which is defined as the response of central banks' policy interest rates to exogenous changes in inflation.

Inflation rates in advanced economies experienced two consecutive puzzles during the period following the global financial crisis—unexpectedly high inflation from the end of 2009 to 2011 and unexpectedly low inflation from 2012 to the middle of 2014. We investigate these developments in two ways. First, we show that accounting for inflation expectations by households explains a significant share of the inflation puzzles at the international level. Second, we find that, for Canada, elevated competition in the retail sector is also important for understanding inflation dynamics in the post-crisis period.