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Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

Until recently, there have been few efforts to systematically measure and aggregate the nominal value of the different types of sovereign government debt in default. To help fill this gap, the Bank of Canada’s Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRAG) has developed a comprehensive database of sovereign defaults posted on the Bank of Canada’s website that now is updated in partnership with the Bank of England.

Using a nonlinear New Keynesian model with a financial accelerator, we show that financial frictions generate large state-dependent amplification effects. Shocks propagate more strongly in periods of financial stress. We propose an endogenous regime-switching DSGE framework for efficient estimation and improved model fit.

Can securities be settled on a blockchain and, if so, what are the gains relative to existing settlement systems? We consider a blockchain that ensures delivery versus payment by linking transfers of assets with payments and operates using a proof-of-work protocol. The main benefit of a blockchain is faster and more flexible settlement, whereas the challenge is to avoid settlement fails when participants fork the chain to get rid of trading losses.

Since 2014, the Bank of Canada (BoC) has maintained a comprehensive database of sovereign defaults to systematically measure and aggregate the nominal value of the different types of sovereign government debt in default. The database is posted on the BoC’s website and is updated annually in partnership with the Bank of England (BoE).

This paper studies how a central bank should design a CBDC when private payment providers collect and monetize transaction data. It characterizes the optimal CBDC’s pricing and data policy, and shows how its effects on private payment use and total data depend on market power and data externalities.

The COVID-19 pandemic uncovered policy challenges related to the economic measures that were taken to support the economy. Two years later, we attempt to identify the broader impact of these measures and research that needs to follow.

We expect potential output growth to be higher than in the October 2020 reassessment. By 2024, growth will be slightly above its average growth from 2010 to 2019. We assess that the Canadian nominal neutral rate continues to lie in the range of 1.75 to 2.75 percent.