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Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

Until recently, there have been few efforts to systematically measure and aggregate the nominal value of the different types of sovereign government debt in default. To help fill this gap, the Bank of Canada’s Credit Rating Assessment Group (CRAG) has developed a comprehensive database of sovereign defaults posted on the Bank of Canada’s website that now is updated in partnership with the Bank of England.

Causes and consequences of declining inflation persistence in Canada; the evolution of capital flows to emerging-market economies (EMEs) and the need for EMEs to implement policies that support capital flows; making bank notes accessible for Canadians living with blindness or low vision, sharing assessments of the suite of accessibility features on the current series of bank notes and plans for the next series.

This paper examines the relationship between volatility shocks and preference shocks in an analytically tractable endogenous growth model with recursive preferences and stochastic volatility. I show that there exists an explicit mapping between volatility shocks and preference shocks, and a rise in volatility generates the same impulse responses of macroeconomic aggregates as a negative preference shock.

When financial system vulnerabilities are elevated, they can give rise to asymmetric risks to the economic outlook. To illustrate this, I consider the economic outlook presented in the Bank of Canada’s October 2017 Monetary Policy Report in the context of two key financial system vulnerabilities: high levels of household indebtedness and housing market imbalances.

Initial coin offerings (ICOs) are a new mode of financing start-ups that saw an explosion in popularity in 2017 but declined in popularity in the second half of 2018 as regulatory pressure, instances of fraud and reports of poor performance began to undermine their reputation.

Discussion of recent research into three ways that oil-futures prices can improve our understanding of current conditions and future prospects in the global market for crude oil; inflation expectations and the conduct of monetary policy: a review of recent evidence and experience; examination of the influence of various forms of economic uncertainty on the performance of different classes of monetary policy rules; how, when, and why such revisions to many important economic variables occur.

We show that changes in sentiment that aren’t related to fundamentals can drive persistent macroeconomic fluctuations even when all economic agents are rational. Changes in sentiment can also affect how fundamental shocks affect macroeconomic outcomes.

This background note explains the Bank’s official position on CBDC. It outlines the public policy, design, technology and risk management issues the Bank is considering as it builds its capacity to issue a CBDC in case it is needed in the future.