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2184 Results

Can the Common-Factor Hypothesis Explain the Observed Housing Wealth Effect?

Staff working paper 2016-62 Narayan Bulusu, Jefferson Duarte, Carles Vergara-Alert
The common-factor hypothesis is one possible explanation for the housing wealth effect. Under this hypothesis, house price appreciation is related to changes in consumption as long as the available proxies for the common driver of housing and non-housing demand are noisy and housing supply is not perfectly elastic.

Breaking Down the US Employment Multiplier Using Micro­-Level Data

Using newly matched data on US defense contracts and restricted administrative employment data, we show that the employment effects of defense procurement are costly, concentrated and slow to diffuse.

Noisy Monetary Policy

Staff working paper 2018-23 Tatjana Dahlhaus, Luca Gambetti
We introduce limited information in monetary policy. Agents receive signals from the central bank revealing new information (“news") about the future evolution of the policy rate before changes in the rate actually take place. However, the signal is disturbed by noise.

Assessing the Impact of the Bank of Canada’s Government Bond Purchases

Staff discussion paper 2024-5 Chinara Azizova, Jonathan Witmer, Xu Zhang
In March 2020, the Bank of Canada implemented the Government of Canada Bond Purchase Program, eventually purchasing approximately $340 billion of government bonds. In this paper, we analyze the impact of this program on financial market prices and yields as well as on GDP and inflation.

Blockchain-Based Settlement for Asset Trading

Staff working paper 2018-45 Jonathan Chiu, Thorsten Koeppl
Can securities be settled on a blockchain and, if so, what are the gains relative to existing settlement systems? We consider a blockchain that ensures delivery versus payment by linking transfers of assets with payments and operates using a proof-of-work protocol. The main benefit of a blockchain is faster and more flexible settlement, whereas the challenge is to avoid settlement fails when participants fork the chain to get rid of trading losses.
November 15, 2012

Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13

Risk and State-Dependent Financial Frictions

Staff working paper 2022-37 Martin Harding, Rafael Wouters
Using a nonlinear New Keynesian model with a financial accelerator, we show that financial frictions generate large state-dependent amplification effects. Shocks propagate more strongly in periods of financial stress. We propose an endogenous regime-switching DSGE framework for efficient estimation and improved model fit.
February 21, 2013

Conference Summary: Financial Intermediation and Vulnerabilities

The Bank of Canada’s annual economic conference, held in October 2012, brought together experts from across Canada and around the world to discuss key issues concerning financial intermediation and vulnerabilities. The conference covered such topics as household finances and their relationship to financial stability, as well as bank regulation, securitization and shadow banking.
Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles JEL Code(s): G, G2
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