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Feedback rules are rules aimed at guiding policy-makers as they face the problem of keeping inflation close to a desired path without causing variability elsewhere in the economy. These rules link short-term interest rates, controlled by the central bank, to the rate of inflation and/or its deviation from a target rate. The authors describe the most popular types of feedback rules and review some simulation results.

This paper studies how a central bank should design a CBDC when private payment providers collect and monetize transaction data. It characterizes the optimal CBDC’s pricing and data policy, and shows how its effects on private payment use and total data depend on market power and data externalities.

This article describes experimental economics, in general, and new developments in experimental macroeconomics, in particular. The approach has a clear niche in providing evidence on economic phenomena that cannot be observed directly or that are difficult to measure. Experimental work conducted by Bank of Canada economists has shed light on a number of issues important to monetary policy, such as the relative efficacy between price-level and inflation targeting, and the nature of inflation expectations formation.

As the Government of Canada’s fiscal agent, the Bank of Canada provides strategic policy advice on the management of the government’s debt, in addition to being responsible for conducting debt-management operations. In this article, the authors review the evolution of the debt strategy over the past 20 years and outline the complex process of developing a sound strategy that balances various cost and risk considerations. This includes an examination of the tools and practices used to develop the new medium-term debt-management strategy, such as the modelling approach involved, market consultations and various debt-management metrics.

To what extent does a central bank digital currency (CBDC) compete with bank deposits? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a structural model where each household chooses which financial institution to deposit their digital money with.

Starting with the winter 2007–08 survey, the results of two additional questions became included in the Business Outlook Survey (BOS) publication: the balance of opinion on past sales and the balance of opinion on credit conditions. This backgrounder briefly describes the two questions and presents the correlations between the responses and relevant economic data.

This article by the Bank's visiting economist examines the role of money in the transmission of monetary policy. Professor Laidler argues against the view of money as a passive variable that reacts to changes in prices, output, and interest rates but has no direct causative effect on them. He maintains that the empirical evidence supports the view of money playing an active role in the transmission mechanism. While he agrees that individual monetary aggregates can be difficult to read because of instabilities in the demand-for-money function, he argues that monetary aggregates, particularly those relating to transactions money, should have a more significant place in the hierarchy of policy variables that the Bank considers when formulating monetary policy.

The authors trace the development of the Basel III standards for banking regulation. Basel III builds on two earlier frameworks, in response to weaknesses revealed during the global financial crisis. They highlight how implementation of the standards will underpin greater financial stability and provide a sound foundation for economic growth.

Today, the Canadian OTC Derivatives Working Group published a paper that sets out preliminary recommendations for implementing Canada's G-20 commitments related to OTC derivatives.