Search

Model risk is a constant danger for financial economists using interest-rate forecasts for the purposes of monetary policy analysis, portfolio allocations, or risk-management decisions. Use of multiple models does not necessarily solve the problem as it greatly increases the work required and still leaves the question "which model forecast should one use?"

This discussion paper represents the work of the inter-agency Canadian OTC Derivatives Working Group (OTCD WG), formed in December 2009, that is chaired by the Bank of Canada and composed of members from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), the federal Department of Finance, the Ontario Securities Commission, the Autorité des marchés financiers, the Alberta Securities Commission and the Bank of Canada.

I am honoured to address members of the Canadian Association for Business Economics. My remarks today will focus on critical issues that the Bank of Canada has studied over the past four years and how this research will inform our work as we move forward post crisis.

Although dealership government and equity securities have, on the surface, similar market structures, the author demonstrates that some subtle differences exist between them that are likely to significantly affect the way market-makers trade, and as such have an impact on the liquidity that they provide.

In this paper, we study the impact of supply shocks on the Canadian real exchange rate. We specify a structural vector-error-correction model that links the real exchange rate to different fundamentals.

Examining the incentives for banks to hold various assets on their balance sheets for use as collateral when the opportunity cost of doing so can be high; an outline of the complexity inherent in any modern risk-management system and review of possible strategies to improve the performance of risk management; causes and consequences of the changing pace of labour reallocation in Canada; description of the structure and functioning of BoC-GEM— an adaptation of the Global Economy Model— with examples of its recent application.

Improving the conduct of monetary policy is unlikely to be the main motivation for central banks to issue a central bank digital currency (CBDC). While some argue that a CBDC could allow more complex transfer schemes or the ability to break below the zero lower bound, we find these benefits might be small or difficult to realize in practice.

Prices of commodities, including metals, energy and agricultural products, rose markedly over the 2009–2010 period. Some observers have attributed a significant part of this increase in commodity prices to the U.S. Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programs.

One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation.