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This note presents a composite indicator of Canadian financial system vulnerabilities—the Vulnerabilities Barometer. It aims to complement the Bank of Canada’s vulnerabilities assessment by adding a quantitative and synthesized perspective to the more granular (distributional) analysis presented in the Financial System Review.

We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly.

We provide empirical evidence on the impact of oil supply shocks on global aggregates. To do this, we first extract structural oil supply shocks from a standard oil-price determination model found in the literature.

Since 2009, the G-20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth has provided a mechanism for international macroeconomic policy coordination. The Framework has had some successes, including agreement on objectives for fiscal consolidation. However, post-crisis global growth has been neither strong nor balanced. Progress has also been slow in developing credible fiscal consolidation plans in some advanced countries and in increasing exchange rate flexibility in certain emerging economies. A stronger peer review process and enhanced analysis of international spillovers would increase the Framework’s influence on member policies.

The premium on “on-the-run” Treasuries is an anomaly. I explain it using a model in which primary dealers hold inventories of Treasuries. I use the model to analyze the effects of granting access to central bank facilities.

We incorporate a participation decision in a standard New Keynesian model with matching frictions and show that treating the labor force as constant leads to incorrect evaluation of alternative policies.

This article examines the incentives for banks to hold various assets on their balance sheets for use as collateral when the opportunity cost of doing so can be high. Focusing on the five-year period (2002-07) that preceded the financial crisis, it examines the choices made by financial institutions among the assets that are pledged as collateral in Canada's Large Value Transfer System. This serves as a baseline for collateral-management practices during relatively normal times. The results of this study are important for policy-makers, especially the Bank of Canada, which is concerned both about the efficient functioning of fixed-income markets and about the credit risk it ultimately bears in insuring LVTS settlement. The results suggest that relative market liquidity and market-making capacity are important factors in the choice of securities pledged as collateral in the LVTS.

The author develops a theoretical model of bank closure. The regulatory decision about bank failure consists of two parts: whether to close and how to close.

This paper documents the structure and properties of the Canadian Policy Analysis Model (CPAM). CPAM is designed to provide a reasonably complete representation of the Canadian macro economy.

This paper calibrates a class of jump-diffusion long-run risks (LRR) models to quantify how well they can jointly explain the equity risk premium and the variance risk premium in the U.S. financial markets, and whether they can generate realistic dynamics of risk-neutral and realized volatilities.