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This note presents measures of liquidity used by the Bank of Canada to monitor market conditions and discusses recent trends in Government of Canada (GoC) fixed-income market liquidity. Our results indicate that the Bank’s measures have improved since the financial crisis. Furthermore, GoC market liquidity deteriorated following several stressful events: the euro crisis in 2011, the taper tantrum in 2013 and the oil price shock in 2015. In all three cases, the deterioration remained within historical norms and liquidity returned to normal levels afterwards.

Consumers believe inflation has fallen, but their expectations for inflation in the near term are showing little progress in returning to pre-pandemic levels. Slow progress may be due to persistently high inflation expectations for services such as rent. In addition, consumers increasingly think domestic factors, such as high government spending, are supporting high inflation, and they believe these factors will take longer to resolve than global factors. Consumers have adjusted their behaviour in response to prolonged high inflation—more people are paying attention to inflation and changing their spending habits. However, actions that may support inflation, such as seeking wage increases to offset it, are dissipating. The negative effects of high interest rates are broadening, and indicators of household financial stress are deteriorating. Consumers remain uncertain about the economic outlook, and this uncertainty is weighing on their spending plans. Workers think the labour market has weakened slightly. However, expectations for wage growth remain high, supported by cost-of-living adjustments in some workers’ wage contracts.

Economists in the nineteenth century spent considerable time discussing the merits of a free-banking system, in which each commercial bank would be able to issue its own notes and deposits, subject to a convertibility requirement backed by its own gold reserves. Such a system, the proponents argued, would be able to deliver price-level stability yet be flexible enough to withstand the vicissitudes of the business cycle. Moreover, there would be no need for central banks. While this idea has received less attention in recent years, some economists still put it forward as a practical alternative to the current system. Laidler suggests that the centralizing tendencies in banking would inevitably undermine competition within a free-banking system, and lead to the natural emergence of one dominant bank. Other developments in the twentieth century, most notably the demise of the gold standard and widespread agreement that governments should play a determining role in setting monetary policy goals, have also limited the practicality of such a system. Laidler examines the Bank of Canada's history from the free-banking perspective and concludes that the current system of inflation targeting provides a much better anchor for orderly price-level behaviour than the free-banking system's convertibility could ever guarantee.

A variety of technology designs could support retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) systems. We develop five archetypes of CBDC systems, outline their characteristics and discuss their trade-offs. This work serves as a framework to analyze and compare different designs, independent of vendor, platform and implementation.

There are two broad classes of arguments for greater flexibility in the design and application of monetary policy frameworks. The BIS has done a great deal of useful work on asset-price targeting in particular and on the complicated interplay between monetary policy and financial stability in general.

The Bank has five main areas of responsibility that affect Canadians’ everyday lives.

The year 2005 marks the 150th anniversary of the establishment of Ottawa as a city. On 1 January 1855, the logging community of Bytown was formally incorporated as a city and adopted Ottawa as its new name.

Given the Institute's membership and its focus on financial stability, I feel safe in saying that all of us here today watched this summer's turbulence in credit markets with interest, to put it mildly. What began in the spring as a repricing of credit risk turned into dislocations that have yet to fully run their course.

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit Canada, the Bank of Canada acted quickly. We needed to make sure the financial system worked well enough that credit could continue to flow. That meant addressing shortages of liquidity in financial markets—the backbone for lending and borrowing in the economy.

It is either brave or foolhardy of the Ottawa Economics Association to organize another conference around Canada's perennial challenges of demographics, productivity, and potential growth.