Search

Innovations in basic information technologies, in payment applications, and in the availability of global markets, as well as substantial changes in financial sector policy, have fundamentally changed how the retail payments system in Canada operates. Principally, the volume and types of electronic payments have grown, and there is increased participation by diverse groups of financial and non-financial institutions as providers of retail payment services. The resulting policy problem for payment systems is how best to benefit from efficiency gains while managing payment risks. O'Connor examines the effect of the technological and legislative changes and the initiatives developed by the public and private sectors in such areas as the market arrangements for services; customer risks and costs for settling large-value retail payments; the security of payment information and the efficiency with which it is transmitted; and the effects of differing regulatory regimes on competition among providers of retail payment services.

Monetary theory says that money is essential if it helps to achieve better incentive-feasible outcomes. We test this in the laboratory.

This paper documents Canada’s recent review of its sovereign debt distribution framework (DDF). Informed by a context of record-high debt issuance since the previous DDF review, along with comparisons with sovereign peers and insights from market participants, the review identified an important need to broaden Canada’s dealer base internationally to support a larger and more diverse set of investors.

This report reviews the use of quantitative tools to gauge market participants’ assessment of banking system resilience. These measures complement traditional balance-sheet metrics and suggest that markets consider large Canadian banks to be better placed to weather adverse shocks than banks in other advanced economies. Compared with regulatory capital ratios, however, the measures suggest less improvement in banking system resilience since the pre-crisis period.

We study the competition between a welfare-maximizing public payment platform (e.g., CBDC or fast payment system) and a profit-maximizing private platform in a two-sided market, deriving optimal public pricing and showing how network effects, fragmentation, and policy mandates like zero fees or cost recovery shape welfare, usage, and fee incidence.

We introduce behavioral learning equilibria (BLE) into DSGE models with boundedly rational agents using simple but optimal first order autoregressive forecasting rules. The Smets-Wouters DSGE model with BLE is estimated and fits well with inflation survey expectations. As a policy application, we show that learning requires a lower degree of interest rate smoothing.

The Canadian Financial Monitor (CFM) survey uses non-probability sampling for data collection, so selection bias is likely. We outline methods for obtaining survey weights and discuss the conditions necessary for these weights to eliminate selection bias. We obtain calibration weights for the 2018 and 2019 online CFM samples.

Repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders create the possibility of dynamic pricing: lenders compete aggressively with low prices to attract new borrowers and then raise their prices once borrowers have made a commitment. We find such pricing patterns in the Canadian mortgage market.

We characterize the bias in cross-sectional Hill estimates caused by common underlying factors and propose two simple-to-implement remedies. To test for the presence, direction and size of the bias, we use monthly US stock returns and annual US Census county population data.