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We introduce behavioral learning equilibria (BLE) into DSGE models with boundedly rational agents using simple but optimal first order autoregressive forecasting rules. The Smets-Wouters DSGE model with BLE is estimated and fits well with inflation survey expectations. As a policy application, we show that learning requires a lower degree of interest rate smoothing.

We analyze the transmission of monetary policy during different phases of a sectoral demand reallocation episode when there are frictions to increasing production in a sector. Monetary policy is more effective in reducing inflation when a larger proportion of sectors are expanding or expect to expand in the near future.

Governor Mark Carney discusses globalization, financial stability and employment.

The spread between long-term and short-term interest rates has proven to be an excellent predictor of changes of economic activity in Canada. As a general rule, when long-term interest rates have been much above short-term rates, strong increases in output have followed within about a year; however, whenever the yield curve has been inverted for any extended period of time, a recession has followed. Similar findings exist for other countries, including the United States. But although Canadian and U.S. interest rates generally move quite closely together, the Canadian yield curve has been distinctly better at predicting future Canadian output. The explanation given for this result is that the term spread has reflected both current monetary conditions, which affect short-term interest rates, and expected real returns on investment and expectations of inflation, which are the main determinants of long-term rates. This article is mainly a summary of econometric work done at the Bank. It also touches on some of the extensive recent literature in this area.

Repeated interactions between borrowers and lenders create the possibility of dynamic pricing: lenders compete aggressively with low prices to attract new borrowers and then raise their prices once borrowers have made a commitment. We find such pricing patterns in the Canadian mortgage market.

This paper examines the quality of projections of real GDP growth taken from the Bank of Canada Monetary Policy Report (MPR) since they were first published in 1997. Over the last decade, it has become common practice among the central banking community to discuss forecast performance publicly.

Amid heightened Canada–US trade tensions in 2025, financial markets showed signs that investors had greater difficulty anticipating near-term Bank of Canada interest rate decisions. We look at the Overnight Index Swap prices and intraday Government of Canada yields to identify the main driver of uncertainty around interest rate decisions.

I study the links between Canadian banks and non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) by observing co-movements in stock prices. Perceived interconnections increased before the COVID-19 pandemic but have since stabilized, with the strongest ties seen between large banks and NBFIs. The secured credit line extended to Home Trust, a non-bank mortgage lender that experienced severe funding stress in 2017, significantly reduced banks' risk exposure to NBFIs during this episode.

During the 1990s the Bank of Canada made several changes that transformed its conduct of monetary policy. In the 1960s and 1970s, policy decisions were made in an environment characterized by instrument opaqueness and goal opaqueness, which tended to shield the Bank's operations from scrutiny and accountability. Since the 1970s the Bank has moved towards transparency and openness by rejecting multiple policy instruments and adopting a single, well-defined goal of inflation control. A recent survey has shown that the Bank of Canada is in the middle range of central banks with regard to its transparency and has lost points for not publishing the forecasts that shape its policy or the minutes and voting records of its governing body. Chant suggests that the public has benefited significantly from the changes the Bank has made, but that it should continue to support research on the benefits of low and stable inflation and continually inform other policy-makers and the public of the results.

The Canadian overnight repo market persistently shows signs of latent funding pressure around month-end periods. Both the overnight repo rate and Bank of Canada liquidity provision tend to rise in these windows. This paper proposes three non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain this phenomenon.