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We demonstrate the ability of reinforcement learning techniques to estimate the best-response functions of banks participating in high-value payments systems—a real-world strategic game of incomplete information.

Senior Deputy Governor Tiff Macklem discusses flexible inflation targeting and “good” and “bad” disinflation.

This paper studies the testable implication of players’ collusive or cooperative behaviour in a binary choice game with complete information. I illustrate the implementation of this test by revisiting the entry game between Walmart and Kmart.

Implications for signal extraction from specifying unobserved components (UC) models with correlated or orthogonal innovations have been well investigated. In contrast, the forecasting implications of specifying UC models with different state correlation structures are less well understood.

Models with default options are hard to solve. We propose an extension of the endogenous grid method that solves default risk models more efficiently and accurately.

We examine local labor markets in the United States and Canada from 1990 to 2011 using comparable household and business data. Wage levels and inequality rise with city population in both countries, albeit less in Canada.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF, or the Fund) has undergone a number of significant policy changes and reforms in the wake of the global financial crisis. Most notably, in December 2015, the United States approved long-delayed legislation to increase the representation of developing countries in the Fund’s governance structure.

We document an increase in deviations from short-term covered interest rate parity (CIP) in the first half of 2015. Since the Swiss National Bank’s (SNB) decision to abandon its minimum exchange rate policy, both the magnitude and volatility of deviations from CIP have increased across several currency pairs. The effect is particularly pronounced for pairs involving the Swiss franc.

The scale of safe assets suggests a structural demand for a safe wealth share beyond transaction and liquidity roles. We study how investors achieve a reference wealth level by combining self-insurance and contingent liquidation of investment. Intermediaries improve upon autarky, insuring investors with poor self-insurance and limiting liquidation.

This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.