June 11, 2009 Collateral Management in the LVTS by Canadian Financial Institutions Bank of Canada Review - Summer 2009 Chris D'Souza This article examines the incentives for banks to hold various assets on their balance sheets for use as collateral when the opportunity cost of doing so can be high. Focusing on the five-year period (2002-07) that preceded the financial crisis, it examines the choices made by financial institutions among the assets that are pledged as collateral in Canada's Large Value Transfer System. This serves as a baseline for collateral-management practices during relatively normal times. The results of this study are important for policy-makers, especially the Bank of Canada, which is concerned both about the efficient functioning of fixed-income markets and about the credit risk it ultimately bears in insuring LVTS settlement. The results suggest that relative market liquidity and market-making capacity are important factors in the choice of securities pledged as collateral in the LVTS. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles
News-Driven International Credit Cycles Staff working paper 2021-66 Galip Kemal Ozhan This paper examines the implications of positive news about future asset values that turn out to be incorrect at a later date in an open economy model with banking. The model captures the patterns of bank credit and current account dynamics in Spain between 2000 and 2010. The model finds that the use of unconventional policies leads to a milder bust. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, F, F3, F32, F4, F41, G, G1, G15, G2, G21 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Household and business credit, Models and tools, Economic models, Structural challenges, International trade, finance and competitiveness
Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences Staff working paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market structure, Models and tools, Economic models
December 9, 2010 Financial System Review - December 2010 Although the global financial system continues to recover gradually from the unprecedented dislocations experienced in recent years, significant downside risks remain. Market concerns over acute fiscal strains in some euro-area countries have intensified sharply in recent weeks.FSR Highlights - December 2010 Content Type(s): Publications, Financial Stability Report
December 14, 1999 Trends in Canada's Merchandise Trade Bank of Canada Review - Winter 1999–2000 Richard Dion The author examines aspects of Canada's trade performance in light of the major trends seen in world trade over the past several decades. Canada has become more integrated with the world economy, and this openness is evident from its greater export orientation, its heavier reliance on imported inputs, and more exposure to foreign competition in its domestic markets. The author analyzes the composition of Canadian trade and the trend towards increasing two-way trade in similar products. He also looks at the increasing integration of trade within regions, which for Canada has meant a greater concentration of exports with the United States. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles
(Optimal) Monetary Policy with and without Debt Staff working paper 2021-5 Boris Chafwehé, Rigas Oikonomou, Romanos Priftis, Lukas Vogel How should policy be designed at high debt levels, when fiscal authorities have little room to adjust taxes? Assigning the monetary authority a role in achieving debt sustainability makes it less effective in stabilizing inflation and output. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C1, C11, E, E3, E31, E5, E52, E58, E6, E62 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission, Monetary policy tools and implementation, Real economy and forecasting
Benchmarks for assessing labour market health: 2023 update Staff analytical note 2023-7 Erik Ens, Kurt See, Corinne Luu We enhance benchmarks for assessing strength in the Canadian labour market. We find the labour market remains tight despite recent strong increases in labour supply, including among prime-working-age women. We also assess the anticipated easing in labour conditions in a context of high population growth. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E2, E24, J, J2, J21, J6 Research Theme(s): Monetary policy, Real economy and forecasting, Structural challenges, Demographics and labour supply
December 11, 2012 Guidance Remarks Mark Carney CFA Society Toronto Toronto, Ontario Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney speaks about central bank policy guidance. Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks
Decomposing Large Banks’ Systemic Trading Losses Staff working paper 2024-6 Radoslav Raykov Do banks realize simultaneous trading losses because they invest in the same assets, or because different assets are subject to the same macro shocks? This paper decomposes the comovements of bank trading losses into two orthogonal channels: portfolio overlap and common shocks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G11, G2, G20 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk
How to Manage Macroeconomic and Financial Stability Risks: A New Framework Staff analytical note 2018-11 Alexander Ueberfeldt, Thibaut Duprey Financial system vulnerabilities increase the downside risk to future GDP growth. Macroprudential tightening significantly reduces financial stability risks associated with vulnerabilities. Monetary policy faces a trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic risks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58, G, G0, G01 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight, Models and tools, Economic models, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission