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This article reviews and examines some of the main explanations for the slow growth that many advanced economies continue to experience seven years after the 2007–09 global financial crisis. Does this muted recovery reflect just a prolonged cycle in the aftermath of a financial crisis? Is it due to a structural inadequacy of demand leading to a long-lasting liquidity trap? Or is it largely supply side in nature, reflecting demographic and technological factors?

Using a structural model, we study the economic consequences of the COVID-19 shock. The uneven consequences, such as higher unemployment among young households, amplify the negative implications for the macroeconomy, household vulnerabilities and consumption inequality. Government support programs have stimulated the economy and lowered inequality and medium-term vulnerabilities.

Cash use for payments has been steadily decreasing in many countries, including Canada and Sweden. This might suggest an evolution toward a cashless society. But in Canada, cash in circulation relative to GDP has been stable for decades and has even increased in recent years. By contrast, the cash-to-GDP ratio in Sweden has been falling steadily. What has caused this difference? Are there lessons to be learned from comparing the Canadian and Swedish experiences?

Deputy Governor Lawrence Schembri speaks before the Economics Society of Northern Alberta (ESNA).

One of the most important arguments in favour of price stability is that unexpected inflation generates changes in the distribution of income and wealth among different economic agents. These redistributions occur because many loans are specified in fixed dollar terms and unexpected inflation redistributes wealth from creditors to debtors by reducing the real value of nominal assets and liabilities.

We find that the CPI and PPI inflation indexes co-moved strongly throughout the late 20th century, but their correlation has fallen substantially since the early 2000s. We offer a structural explanation for this divergence based on the growth of global supply chains since 2000. This finding offers a unique perspective for the future design of optimal monetary policy.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly increased the demand for cash. Cash in circulation increased sharply from March through December 2020, particularly in the early months of this period. Although use of electronic methods of payment also increased significantly, cash use for payments remains high for low-value transactions and among certain demographic groups.

We use narrative evidence along with a novel database of real-time data and forecasts from the Bank of Canada's staff economic projections from 1974 to 2015 to construct a new measure of monetary policy shocks and estimate the effects of monetary policy in Canada.

We simulate introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and consider consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and usage at the point of sale. Modest adoption frictions significantly inhibit CBDC market penetration along all three dimensions. Incumbent responses to restore pre-CBDC market shares are moderate to small and further reduce the impact of a CBDC.

In the interest of better understanding the impact of the Bank of Canada's policy actions on bond and bill yields, Andreou assesses the impact of policy-rate announcements on short and long bonds over the period 1996 to 2004. To aid the analysis, policy actions are decomposed into expected and surprise components. He also examines whether the introduction of fixed announcement dates (FADs) has affected these results, including markets' perceptions. The main finding is that unexpected policy actions by the Bank have a significant effect on market rates at the shorter end of the yield curve, with the effect dissipating as the maturity increases. A second finding, that the impact on longer-term interest rates of a surprise action by the Bank has diminished since the introduction of the FADs, suggests that the Bank's long-term policy goals are well understood and credible.