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This paper studies the effects of foreign exchange (FX) interventions in a two-region model where governments issue both short- and long-term bonds. We find that the term premium channel dominates the trade balance channel in our calibrated model. As a result, the conventional beggar-thy-neighbor effects of interventions are overturned.

These past few months have been busy for central bankers, to say the least, and the past few days are certainly no exception. While developments on Wall Street have garnered much attention, the cost of living has also been an issue for us all, whether we're buying gas at the pumps, booking an airline ticket, or just picking up a loaf of bread at the grocery store.

Over the last few decades, real interest rates have trended downward. The most common explanation is that this reflects depressed demand due to demographic, technological and other real factors. We explore the claim that these trends may have been amplified by certain features of monetary policy.

Information about the role of emergency lending assistance in recovery and resolution, and about its terms and conditions, eligibility criteria, management, and relationship to the standing liquidity facility.

The authors use a dynamic general-equilibrium model to study the role financial frictions play as a transmission mechanism of Canadian monetary policy, and to evaluate the real effects of exogenous credit shocks. Financial frictions, which are modelled as spreads between deposit and loan interest rates, are assumed to depend on economic activity as well as on credit shocks.

Based on empirical evidence, I propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with two financial sectors to analyze the role of corporate debt composition (bank versus bond financing) in the transmission of economic shocks.

The Canadian overnight repo market persistently shows signs of latent funding pressure around month-end periods. Both the overnight repo rate and Bank of Canada liquidity provision tend to rise in these windows. This paper proposes three non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain this phenomenon.

This paper considers an economy where central-bank-issued fiat money competes with privately issued e-money. We study a policy-setting game between the central bank and the e-money issuer and find (1) the optimal monetary policy of the central bank depends on the policy of the private issuer and may deviate from the Friedman rule; (2) multiple equilibria may exist; (3) when the economy approaches a cashless state, the central bank’s optimal policy improves the market power of the e-money issuer and can lead to a discrete decrease in welfare and a discrete increase in inflation; and (4) first best cannot be achieved.

Markets for securitized assets were characterized by high liquidity prior to the recent financial crisis and by a sudden market dry-up at the onset of the crisis. A general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investment opportunities and information frictions predicts that, in boom periods or mild recessions, the degree of adverse selection in resale markets for securitized assets is limited because of the reputation-based guarantees by asset originators.