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Recent evidence finds a positive association between the prevalence of loans of inferior quality and the growth in securitized products. Some attribute this development to the lack of incentives for originators to screen and monitor the performance of securitized loans; others stress that certain factors, such as balance-sheet management, also contributed to the problem, making it difficult to pin down the reason for the proliferation of such loans during the period of high securitization growth. The author reviews the conflicts of interest between participants in the securitization process that contributed to the ongoing financial turmoil and highlights the most recent policy measures and potential solutions for ameliorating these agency issues.

Over the past year and a half, authors Andy Haldane of the Bank of England and Mark Kruger of the Bank of Canada have been developing a framework for the resolution of international financial crises that aligns incentives for all parties in a way that deals with the crisis and preserves the integrity of the international financial system. The framework is built on principles, not rules. It attempts to be clear about the respective roles and responsibilities of the public and private sectors. A central element in shaping private sector expectations is knowledge that the official sector will behave predictably. Constraints on lending by the International Monetary Fund are a key step in that direction. They ensure that private sector involvement is a crucial part of crisis resolution, and they help encourage debtors and creditors to seek co-operative solutions to a crisis. Characterized by constraints, clarity, and orderliness, the framework has the potential to reduce the incidence and cost of financial crises.

There have been positive developments in the global financial system since the June Financial System Review, in part reflecting some encouraging signs about the global economy. At the same time, significant vulnerabilities remain. The Governing Council judges that the overall risk to the stability of Canada’s financial system has decreased from “high” to “elevated” over the past six months.

Governor Mark Carney reviews the advantages of Canada’s flexible inflation-targeting regime.

Deputy Governor Tim Lane will discuss the importance of shadow banking, its fragilities, and reform efforts underway to make it more resilient.

The Financial System Review concludes that the overall level of risk to Canada’s financial system is largely unchanged from six months ago. While household vulnerabilities have moved higher, the ongoing economic recovery in Canada means that the overall risk remains the same. The Bank highlights three vulnerabilities in the financial system: the elevated level of household indebtedness, imbalances in some regional housing markets and the fragility of liquidity in fixed-income markets.

Examination of progress in the Bank’s exploration of two alternatives to the current inflation-targeting framework: (i) lowering the inflation target and (ii) shifting to a price-level target; a review of arguments for and against price-level targeting, focusing on its costs and benefits compared with inflation targeting; assessing the merits of price-level targeting vis-à-vis inflation targeting from a debt-revaluation perspective; quantifying redistribution of wealth in Canada in the face of unexpected inflation.

The Reports section of the Financial System Review examines selected issues of relevance to the Canadian and global financial systems. The June 2014 issue features three reports on financial system initiatives: making financial benchmarks more robust; implementing the stronger Basel III capital and liquidity framework for banks; and using stress tests to assess financial system risks.

The emergence of digital currencies such as Bitcoin and the underlying blockchain and distribution ledger technology have attracted significant attention. These developments have raised the possibility of considerable impacts on the financial system and perhaps the wider economy.

Using a general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities and financial frictions, we explore whether introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) affects the transmission of monetary policy, and how the effects depend on CBDC design features. We also study whether paying interest on central bank liabilities is contractionary or expansionary.