Monetary Policy Tradeoffs Between Financial Stability and Price Stability Staff working paper 2016-49 Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt We analyze the impact of interest rate policy on financial stability in an environment where banks can experience runs on their short-term liabilities, forcing them to sell assets at fire-sale prices. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Monetary policy, Monetary policy framework and transmission
Information Sharing and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks Staff working paper 2016-63 Sofia Priazhkina, Frank H. Page This paper presents a model of strategic buyer-seller networks with information exchange between sellers. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers can share access to buyers for a negotiated transfer. We study how this information exchange affects overall market prices, volumes and welfare, given different initial market conditions and information sharing rules. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C7, C71, C78, D, D2, D21, D4, D43, D8, D85, L, L1, L13 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure
November 20, 2003 Technical Note: Elimination of Retroactive Settlement in the ACSS Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2003 Eric Tuer Effective 1 November 2003, the Bank of Canada abandoned its practice of backdating the results of settlement of payments through the Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS). It has adopted instead a system of "next-day" settlement under which the results of the settlement process will appear on the central bank's books on the day the items actually settle in the ACSS. Since July 1986, settlement of these items had occurred at noon the day after items were presented for clearing, but the results were recognized on the Bank's books the previous day, through backdating, or "retroactive" settlement. The new system should simplify the payments process and improve the reporting of settlement risk, as well as promote cost-effectiveness within the payments systems. ACSS participants have agreed among themselves to implement an interest-compensation mechanism in order to avoid imposing a float charge on their customer base. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles
January 29, 2018 Chartered banks: Total claims booked worldwide vis-à-vis non-residents (formerly C10) Quarter-end data on chartered bank non-residents’ foreign and Canadian currency claims.
Is the Discretionary Income Effect of Oil Price Shocks a Hoax? Staff working paper 2017-50 Christiane Baumeister, Lutz Kilian, Xiaoqing Zhou The transmission of oil price shocks has been a question of central interest in macroeconomics since the 1970s. There has been renewed interest in this question after the large and persistent fall in the real price of oil in 2014–16. In the context of this debate, Ramey (2017) makes the striking claim that the existing literature on the transmission of oil price shocks is fundamentally confused about the question of how to quantify the effect of oil price shocks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C5, C51, Q, Q4, Q43 Research Theme(s): Models and tools, Econometric, statistical and computational methods, Economic models, Monetary policy, Inflation dynamics and pressures, Real economy and forecasting
The “Too Big to Fail” Subsidy in Canada: Some Estimates Staff working paper 2018-9 Patricia Palhau Mora Implicit government guarantees of banking-sector liabilities reduce market discipline by private sector stakeholders and temper the risk sensitivity of funding costs. This potentially increases the likelihood of bailouts from taxpayers, especially in the absence of effective resolution frameworks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): G, G1, G13, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
May 17, 2012 Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2012 This issue features a summary of the Bank’s annual conference, which took place in November 2011 and dealt with payments systems, and two articles that present research by Bank staff on global current account imbalances and macrofinancial risk assessment. The fourth article in this issue reviews the recent experience with inflation targeting. Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review
The MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), Version 2.0 Technical report No. 111 Jose Fique This report provides a detailed technical description of the updated MacroFinancial Risk Assessment Framework (MFRAF), which replaces the version described in Gauthier, Souissi and Liu (2014) as the Bank of Canada’s stress-testing model for banks with a focus on domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs). Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports JEL Code(s): C, C7, C72, E, E5, E58, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial stability and systemic risk, Financial system regulation and oversight
Do Canadian Broker-Dealers Act as Agents or Principals in Bond Trading? Staff analytical note 2017-11 Daniel Hyun, Jesse Johal, Corey Garriott Technology, risk tolerance and regulation may influence dealers to reduce their trading as principals (using their own balance sheets for sales and purchases of securities) in favour of agency trading (matching client trades). Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G20, L, L1 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Market structure
Interconnected Banks and Systemically Important Exposures Staff working paper 2019-44 Alan Roncoroni, Stefano Battiston, Marco D’Errico, Grzegorz Halaj, Christoffer Kok How do banks' interconnections in the euro area contribute to the vulnerability of the banking system? We study both the direct interconnections (banks lend to each other) and the indirect interconnections (banks are exposed to similar sectors of the economy). These complex linkages make the banking system more vulnerable to contagion risks. Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers JEL Code(s): C, C6, C63, G, G1, G15, G2, G21 Research Theme(s): Financial markets and funds management, Market functioning, Financial system, Financial institutions and intermediation, Financial stability and systemic risk