ElasticSearch Score: 6.7212734
May 20, 1997
Since the last Report, the Canadian economy has advanced broadly in line with expectations.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.621368
October 21, 2004
The Canadian economy continues to adjust to major global developments.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.42602
April 14, 2005
The global economy has been unfolding largely as expected, and prospects for continued robust growth are quite favourable, especially over the near term.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.405666
We study competition for consumer attention, in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the “addictiveness” of its service.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.3580356
We study the formation of price bubbles on experimental asset markets where cash earns interest. There are two main conclusions.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.3493776
Modeling and estimating persistent discrete data can be challenging. In this paper, we use an autoregressive panel probit model where the autocorrelation in the discrete variable is driven by the autocorrelation in the latent variable. In such a non-linear model, the autocorrelation in an unobserved variable results in an intractable likelihood containing high-dimensional integrals.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.2234893
April 27, 2006
The Canadian economy continues to grow at a solid pace, consistent with the Bank’s outlook in the January Monetary Policy Report Update.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.2190924
January 30, 2006
In 2005, the Bank of Canada celebrated its 70th anniversary. Since the Bank opened its doors in March 1935, it has evolved into a national institution at the heart of Canada’s economy. We had a lot to celebrate in 2005—particularly our progress over the past 70 yearsand our continuing contribution to the economic and financial well-being of Canadians.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.1270823
January 29, 2001
The Canadian economy continued to expand robustly in 2000 while inflation remained low.
ElasticSearch Score: 6.116086
This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.