Change theme
Change theme

Search

Content Types

Topics

JEL Codes

Locations

Departments

Authors

Sources

Statuses

Published After

Published Before

9105 Results

Limited Commitment, Endogenous Credibility and the Challenges of Price-level Targeting

Staff Working Paper 2018-61 Gino Cateau, Malik Shukayev
This paper studies the cost of limited commitment when a central bank has the discretion to adjust policy whenever the costs of honoring its past commitments become high. Specifically, we consider a central bank that seeks to implement optimal policy in a New Keynesian model by committing to a price-level target path.

Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours

Staff Working Paper 2018-60 Erhao Xie
This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.
Go To Page