Antoine Camous - Latest

• The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence

  Staff Working Paper 2022-11 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev

  Central banks in many advanced economies enjoy a high degree of independence, which protects monetary policy decisions from political influence. But how should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policy-makers? We examine whether a central bank should design a monetary policy framework that prescribes acting conditionally on how fiscal policy behaves.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Fiscal policy, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E0, E02, E5, E52, E58, E6, E61, E62

• Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence

  Staff Analytical Note 2019-33 Antoine Camous, Dmitry Matveev

  We illustrate how market data can be informative about the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy. Federal funds futures are private contracts that reflect investor’s expectations about monetary policy decisions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Central bank research, Credibility, Financial markets, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58