Staff research

Instant Payments, Fraud, and Optimal Consumer Protection

Staff working paper 2026-41 Yuteng Cheng, Charles M. Kahn, Francisco Rivadeneyra
This paper studies how fraud prevention should be organized in instant payment systems. It compares centralized and decentralized governance, showing how access pricing, payment eligibility, prevention incentives, and liability allocation jointly determine fraud risk and the set of payments admitted to the system.

Data Externalities, Market Power, and the Optimal Design of Central Bank Digital Currencies

This paper studies how a central bank should design a CBDC when private payment providers collect and monetize transaction data. It characterizes the optimal CBDC’s pricing and data policy, and shows how its effects on private payment use and total data depend on market power and data externalities.

Fire Sales and Liquidity Requirements

Staff working paper 2024-18 Yuteng Cheng, Roberto Robatto
We study liquidity requirements in a framework with fire sales. The framework nests three common pricing mechanisms and produces the same observables. Absent risk-sharing considerations, the equilibrium is efficient with cash-in-the-market pricing; a liquidity requirement is optimal with second-best-use pricing; and a liquidity ceiling (i.e., a cap on liquid assets) is optimal with adverse selection.

CBDC: Banking and Anonymity

Staff working paper 2024-9 Yuteng Cheng, Ryuichiro Izumi
We examine the optimal amount of user anonymity in a central bank digital currency in the context of bank lending. Anonymity, defined as the lender’s inability to discern an entrepreneur’s actions that enable fund diversion, influences the choice of payment instrument due to its impact on a bank’s lending decisions.

Mandatory Retention Rules and Bank Risk

Staff working paper 2023-3 Yuteng Cheng
This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the unintended consequences of mandatory retention rules in securitization. It proposes a novel model showing that while retention strengthens monitoring, it may also encourage banks to shift risk.

See More