Skylar Brooks
Senior Economist
- PhD (2019) Global Governance, University of Waterloo, Balsillie School of International Affairs
- MA (2013) Global Governance, University of Waterloo, Balsillie School of International Affairs
- Bachelor of Public Affairs and Policy Management (2012), Carleton University
Bio
Skylar Brooks is a Senior Economist in the Financial Stability Department. His research and policy work are informed by a longstanding interest in financial crises and the institutions designed to manage them. He has written extensively about international arrangements for helping sovereign states restructure their debts. Today, his work focuses primarily on domestic financial stability tools, particularly on the role of central banks as providers of backstop liquidity. Skylar holds a PhD in Global Governance from the University of Waterloo.
Staff discussion papers
Revisiting the Monetary Sovereignty Rationale for CBDCs
One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation.Journal publications
Refereed Journals
“What finance wants: explaining change in private regulatory preferences toward sovereign debt restructuring,” Review of International Political Economy 28(6) (2021): 1509-1526.
“The Politics of Regulatory Design in the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Regime,” Global Governance 25(3) (2019): 393-417.
“Debt politics as usual? Reforming the sovereign debt restructuring regime after 2008” (with Eric Helleiner), International Affairs 93(5) (2017): 1085-1105.
“Governing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Through Regulatory Standards,” (with Domenico Lombardi), Journal of Globalization and Development 6(2) (2015): 287-318.
“Los problemas de equidad entre acreedores, y entre deudores y acreedores, en la reestructuración de la deuda soberana” (with Martin Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, and Joseph E. Stiglitz), Investigaciones Económicas 73 (2015): 7-25.
“How Green is Our Money? Mapping the Relationship Between Monetary Systems and the Environment,” International Journal of Community Currency Research 19 (2015): 12-18.
“Strengthening the Early Warning Exercise: Enhancing IMF and FSB coordination” (with Bessma Momani, Michael Cockburn, Warren Clarke, and Dustyn Lanz), World Economics 14(3) (2013): 133-151.
Book Chapters
“Private Creditor Power and the Politics of Sovereign Debt Governance” (with Domenico Lombardi). In Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign Debt Crises, edited by Martin Guzman, Jose Antonio Ocampo, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. New York: Columbia University Press (2016).
Policy Papers and Other Publications
“Identifying and Resolving Inter-Creditor and Debtor-Creditor Equity Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (with Martin Guzman, Domenico Lombardi, and Joseph E. Stiglitz), CIGI Policy Brief No. 53 (2015).
“Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Issues Paper” (with Domenico Lombardi), CIGI Paper No. 64 (2015).
“Mexican Perspectives on Sovereign Debt Management and Restructuring” (with Domenico Lombardi), CIGI Policy Brief No. 61 (2015).
“African Perspectives on Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (with Domenico Lombardi and Ezra Suruma), CIGI Papers No. 43 (2014).
“Sovereign Debt in Turbulent Times” (with Domenico Lombardi), Longitude No. 41 (2014).
“IMF Lending Practices and Sovereign Debt Restructuring” (with James Boughton and Domenico Lombardi), CIGI Policy Brief No. 41 (2014).
“As the euro tries to emerge” (with Domenico Lombardi), Longitude No. 34 (2014).
“Where the world gathers under one umbrella” (with Domenico Lombardi), Longitude No. 32 (2014).
“Coordination Critical to Ensuring that the Early Warning Exercise is Effective” (with Bessma Momani, Michael Cockburn, Warren Clarke, and Dustyn Lanz), CIGI-BSIA Policy Brief Series, Policy Brief No. 4 (2013).