Staff working papers
Are Currency Crises Low-State Equilibria? An Empirical, Three-Interest-Rate Model
Suppose that the dynamics of the macroeconomy were given by (partly) random fluctuations between two equilibria: "good" and "bad."Pocket Banks and Out-of-Pocket Losses: Links between Corruption and Contagion
The author describes a model with a corrupt banking system, in which bankers knowingly lend at market interest rates to back projects riskier than the market rate indicates.Educational Spillovers: Does One Size Fit All?
In a search model of production, where agents accumulate heterogeneous amounts of human capital, an individual worker's wage depends on average human capital in the searching population.When Bad Things Happen to Good Banks: Contagious Bank Runs and Currency Crises
The author develops a twin crisis model featuring multiple banks.Anatomy of a Twin Crisis
The author presents a model of a twin crisis, in which foreign and domestic residents play a banking game. Both "honest" and run equilibria of the post-deposit subgame exist; some run equilibria lead to a currency crisis, as agents convert domestic currency to foreign currency.Bank publications
Bank of Canada Review articles
April 15, 2006