Alex is a Senior Economist. His primary research interests are in Microeconomics and Industrial Organization with focus on empirical dynamic models of consumer and producer behavior.
We simulate the impact of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) on consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and use of different payment methods. Modest frictions that deter consumer adoption of a CBDC inhibit its market penetration. Minor pricing responses by financial institutions and payment service providers further reduce the impact of a CBDC.
This note analyzes different economic models of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) ecosystem where the central bank chooses different levels of market involvement and usage of policy levers. The analysis suggests that there are trade-offs between the costs to the central bank and its ability to achieve policy goals like universal access.
We simulate introducing a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and consider consumer adoption, merchant acceptance and usage at the point of sale. Modest adoption frictions significantly inhibit CBDC market penetration along all three dimensions. Incumbent responses to restore pre-CBDC market shares are moderate to small and further reduce the impact of a CBDC.
We construct and estimate a structural two-stage model of equilibrium in a market for payments in order to quantify the network externalities and identify the main determinants of consumer and merchant decisions.
The elimination of long-term contracts and early termination fees (ETFs) in the US wireless industry at the end of 2015 increased monthly service fees by 2 to 5 percent. Nevertheless, consumers are clearly better off without ETFs. While firms’ revenues from ETFs vanish, their profits from monthly fees increase. As a result, the overall effect on producer profits is less clear.
Using a two-stage model, we study the determinants of Canadian consumers’ choices of payment method at the point of sale. We estimate consumer preferences and adoption costs for various combinations of payment methods. We analyze how introducing a central bank digital currency would affect the market equilibrium.
Recent consumer and merchant surveys show a decrease in the use of cash at the point of sale. Increasingly, consumers and merchants have access to a growing array of payment innovations as substitutes for cash.
Proportional reduction is a common cartel practice in which cartel members reduce their output proportionately. We develop a method to quantify this reduction relative to a benchmark market equilibrium scenario and relate the reduction to the traditional conduct parameter.
