Héctor Pérez Saiz

Author

Staff discussion papers

A Calibrated Model of Intraday Settlement

Staff Discussion Paper 2018-3 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Siddharth Untawala, Gabriel Xerri
This paper estimates potential exposures, netting benefits and settlement gains by merging retail and wholesale payments into batches and conducting multiple intraday settlements in this hypothetical model of a single "calibrated payments system." The results demonstrate that credit risk exposures faced by participants in the system are largely dependent on their relative activity in the retail and wholesale payments systems.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23

Tail Risk in a Retail Payment System: An Extreme-Value Approach

Staff Discussion Paper 2018-2 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Blair Williams, Gabriel Xerri
The increasing importance of risk management in payment systems has led to the development of an array of sophisticated tools designed to mitigate tail risk in these systems. In this paper, we use extreme value theory methods to quantify the level of tail risk in the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) for the period from 2002 to 2015.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23

Credit Risk and Collateral Demand in a Retail Payment System

Staff Discussion Paper 2016-16 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Gabriel Xerri
The recent financial crisis has led to the development of new regulations to control risk in designated payment systems, and the implementation of new credit risk management standards is one of the key issues. In this paper, we study various credit risk management schemes for the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) that are designed to cover the exposure of a defaulting member.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23

Public Policy Objectives and the Next Generation of CPA Systems: An Analytical Framework

Staff Discussion Paper 2015-6 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Sajjad Jafri, Héctor Pérez Saiz
The payments landscape in Canada is rapidly changing and will continue to evolve, fuelled by strong and persistent drivers. In Canada, the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) is on a path to modernize Canada’s core payment systems.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Economic models, Financial services, Financial system regulation and policies, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, L, L1, L14, L15, L5, L52

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Staff working papers

Geographical and Cultural Proximity in Retail Banking

Staff Working Paper 2023-2 Santiago Carbo-Valverde, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Hongyu Xiao
This paper measures how both geographical and cultural proximity of bank branches affect household credit choice and pricing. For credit products that require high levels of ex-ante screening, we find that both proximities can complement each other in reducing the cost of providing soft information, thereby increasing credit access.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credit and credit aggregates, Financial institutions, Financial services JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83, G, G2, G20, G21, R, R2, R22, Z, Z1, Z10, Z13

Measuring Systemic Risk Across Financial Market Infrastructures

Staff Working Paper 2016-10 Fuchun Li, Héctor Pérez Saiz
We measure systemic risk in the network of financial market infrastructures (FMIs) as the probability that two or more FMIs have a large credit risk exposure to the same FMI participant.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23

Emergency Liquidity Facilities, Signalling and Funding Costs

Staff Working Paper 2015-44 Céline Gauthier, Alfred Lehar, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Moez Souissi
In the months preceding the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, banks were willing to pay a premium over the Federal Reserve’s discount window (DW) rate to participate in the much less flexible Term Auction Facility (TAF). We empirically test the predictions of a new signalling model that offers a rationale for offering two different liquidity facilities.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Lender of last resort JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28

To Link or Not To Link? Netting and Exposures Between Central Counterparties

Staff Working Paper 2013-6 Stacey Anderson, Jean-Philippe Dion, Héctor Pérez Saiz
This paper provides a framework to compare linked and unlinked CCP configurations in terms of total netting achieved by market participants and the total system default exposures that exist between participants and CCPs.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G23

When Lower Risk Increases Profit: Competition and Control of a Central Counterparty

Staff Working Paper 2012-35 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive
We model the behavior of dealers in Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives markets where a small number of dealers trade with a continuum of heterogeneous clients (hedgers). Imperfect competition and (endogenous) default induce a familiar trade-off between competition and risk.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G10, G18

Building New Plants or Entering by Acquisition? Estimation of an Entry Model for the U.S. Cement Industry

Staff Working Paper 2011-1 Héctor Pérez Saiz
In many industries, firms usually have two choices when expanding into new markets: They can either build a new plant (greenfield entry) or they can acquire an existing incumbent. In the U.S. cement industry, the comparative advantage (e.g., TFP or size) of entrants versus incumbents and regulatory entry barriers are important factors that determine the means of expansion.
Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing, Productivity JEL Code(s): L, L1, L13, L4, L40, L6, L61

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Bank publications

Bank of Canada Review articles

November 15, 2012

Access, Competition and Risk in Centrally Cleared Markets

Bank of Canada Review - Autumn 2012 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Héctor Pérez Saiz, Joshua Slive

Central counterparties can make over-the-counter markets more resilient and reduce systemic risk by mitigating and managing counterparty credit risk. These benefits are maximized when access to central counterparties is available to a wide range of market participants. In an over-the-counter market, there is an important trade-off between risk and competition. A model of an over-the-counter market shows how risk and competition could be influenced by the incentives of market participants as they move to central clearing. In a centrally cleared market, there may be less risk when participation is high. This helps to explain why regulators have put in place requirements for fair, open and risk-based access criteria.

Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G18, G2, G21, L, L1, L13

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