Posts

• The Share of Systematic Variations in the Canadian Dollar—Part II

  Staff Analytical Note 2017-1 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, Guillaume Nolin

  This analytical note examines how much of the systematic variation in the Canadian dollar is attributable to its sensitivity to commodity prices. We introduce a new “oil” portfolio that captures systematic variations when the exchange rates of commodity exporters and commodity importers move in opposite directions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Exchange rates JEL Code(s): F, F3, F31
• February 21, 2017

  The Potential for FinTech to Transform the Financial System in Canada

  Remarks Carolyn A. Wilkins Ottawa, Ontario

  Comments to the Competition Bureau of Canada.

  Content Type(s): Press, Speeches and appearances, Remarks Topic(s): Digital currencies and fintech

• Expropriation Risk and FDI in Developing Countries: Does Return of Capital Dominate Return on Capital?

  Staff Working Paper 2017-9 M. Akhtaruzzaman, Nathan Berg, Christopher Hajzler

  Previously reported effects of institutional quality and political risks on foreign direct investment (FDI) are mixed and, therefore, difficult to interpret. We present empirical evidence suggesting a relatively clear, statistically robust, and intuitive characterization.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Development economics, International financial markets JEL Code(s): D, D2, D23, F, F2, F21, F23
• February 17, 2017

  Weekly Financial Statistics - 17 February 2017

  Content Type(s): Publications, Historical: Weekly Financial Statistics

• Adoption Costs of Financial Innovation: Evidence from Italian ATM Cards

  Staff Working Paper 2017-8 Kim Huynh, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Gregor W. Smith, Angelika Welte

  The discrete choice to adopt a financial innovation affects a household’s exposure to inflation and transactions costs. We model this adoption decision as being subject to an unobserved cost.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial services JEL Code(s): C, C3, C35, D, D1, D14, E, E4, E41

• Banking Regulation and Market Making

  Staff Working Paper 2017-7 David Cimon, Corey Garriott

  We model how securities dealers respond to regulations on leverage, position and liquidity such as those imposed by the Basel III framework. We show that while asset prices exhibit greater price impact, bid-ask spreads do not change and trading volumes may even increase.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G20, L, L1, L10

• Optimal Capital Regulation

  Staff Working Paper 2017-6 Stéphane Moyen, Josef Schroth

  We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credit and credit aggregates, Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E1, E13, E3, E32, E4, E44

• Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies

  Staff Working Paper 2017-5 Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, Warren E. Weber

  This paper studies the period in Canada when both private bank notes and government-issued notes (Dominion notes) were simultaneously in circulation. Because both of these notes shared many of the characteristics of today's digital currencies, the experience with these notes can be used to draw lessons about how digital currencies might perform.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E58

• Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

  Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov

  Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61
• February 10, 2017

  Weekly Financial Statistics - 10 February 2017

  Content Type(s): Publications, Historical: Weekly Financial Statistics