The author explores a fundamental trade-off that occurs between settlement delay and intraday liquidity in the daily operation of large-value payment systems (LVPS), with specific application to Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS).
Many countries prohibit large shareholdings in their domestic banks.The authors examine whether such a restriction restrains competition in a duopolistic loan market. Blockholders may influence managers' output decisions by choosing capital structure, as in Brander and Lewis (1986).
Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) is designed to meet international risk-proofing standards at a minimum cost to participants in terms of collateral requirements.
The authors develop a search model of venture capital in which the number of successful matches of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists (VCs) at any moment in time is a function of the number of entrepreneurs searching for funds, the number of VCs searching for entrepreneurs, and the number of vacancies posted by each VC.
The author describes a model with a corrupt banking system, in which bankers knowingly lend at market interest rates to back projects riskier than the market rate indicates.
The author develops the first comparative empirical study of bank failures during the nineties between East Asia and Latin America using bank-level data, in order to address the following two questions: (i) To what extent did individual bank conditions explain bank failures? (ii) Did mainly the weakest banks, in terms of their fundamentals, fail in the crisis countries?
The authors measure the economies of scale of Canada's six largest banks and their costefficiency over time. Using a unique panel data set from 1983 to 2003, they estimate pooled translog cost functions and derive measures of relative efficiency and economies of scale.