G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

• The Rise of Non-Regulated Financial Intermediaries in the Housing Sector and its Macroeconomic Implications

  Staff Working Paper 2017-36 Hélène Desgagnés

  I examine the impact of non-regulated lenders in the mortgage market using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. My model features two types of financial intermediaries that differ in three ways: (i) only regulated intermediaries face a capital requirement, (ii) non-regulated intermediaries finance themselves by selling securities and cannot accept deposits, and (iii) non-regulated intermediaries face a more elastic demand.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models, Financial system regulation and policies, Housing JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, E47, E6, E60, G, G2, G21, G23, G28

• Retrieving Implied Financial Networks from Bank Balance-Sheet and Market Data

  Staff Working Paper 2017-30 Jose Fique

  In complex and interconnected banking systems, counterparty risk does not depend only on the risk of the immediate counterparty but also on the risk of others in the network of exposures.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): C, C6, C63, D, D8, D85, G, G2, G21

• Information Contagion and Systemic Risk

  Staff Working Paper 2017-29 Co-Pierre Georg, Toni Ahnert

  We examine the effect of ex-post information contagion on the ex-ante level of systemic risk defined as the probability of joint bank default.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G1, G11, G2, G21

• What Explains Month-End Funding Pressure in Canada?

  Staff Discussion Paper 2017-9 Christopher S. Sutherland

  The Canadian overnight repo market persistently shows signs of latent funding pressure around month-end periods. Both the overnight repo rate and Bank of Canada liquidity provision tend to rise in these windows. This paper proposes three non-mutually exclusive hypotheses to explain this phenomenon.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Interest rates, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy implementation, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E43, E5, E52, E58, F, F3, F36, G, G1, G14, G15, G2, G21
• June 8, 2017

  Using Market-Based Indicators to Assess Banking System Resilience

  Financial System Review - June 2017 Cameron MacDonald, Maarten van Oordt

  This report reviews the use of quantitative tools to gauge market participants’ assessment of banking system resilience. These measures complement traditional balance-sheet metrics and suggest that markets consider large Canadian banks to be better placed to weather adverse shocks than banks in other advanced economies. Compared with regulatory capital ratios, however, the measures suggest less improvement in banking system resilience since the pre-crisis period.

  Content Type(s): Publications, Financial System Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial stability JEL Code(s): G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G2, G21
• May 11, 2017

  Wholesale Funding of the Big Six Canadian Banks

  Bank of Canada Review - Spring 2017 Matthieu Truno, Andriy Stolyarov, Danny Auger, Michel Assaf

  The Big Six Canadian banks are a dominant component of the Canadian financial system. How they finance their business activities is fundamental to how effective they are. Retail and commercial deposits along with wholesale funding represent the two major sources of funds for Canadian banks. What wholesale funding instruments do the Big Six banks use? How do they choose between different funding sources, funding strategies and why? How have banks changed their funding mix since the 2007–09 global financial crisis?

  Content Type(s): Publications, Bank of Canada Review articles Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing, Wholesale funding JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, F, F3, G, G0, G01, G1, G10, G12, G15, G2, G20, G21, G28, O, O1, O16

• The Costs of Point-of-Sale Payments in Canada

  Staff Discussion Paper 2017-4 Anneke Kosse, Heng Chen, Marie-Hélène Felt, Valéry Dongmo Jiongo, Kerry Nield, Angelika Welte

  Using data from our 2014 cost-of-payments survey, we calculate resource costs for cash, debit cards and credit cards. For each payment method, we examine the total cost incurred by consumers, retailers, financial institutions and infrastructures, the Royal Canadian Mint and the Bank of Canada.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): D, D1, D12, D2, D23, D24, E, E4, E41, E42, G, G2, G21, L, L2

• Non-Bank Investors and Loan Renegotiations

  Staff Working Paper 2016-60 Teodora Paligorova, João Santos

  We document that the structure of syndicates affects loan renegotiations. Lead banks with large retained shares have positive effects on renegotiations. In contrast, more diverse syndicates deter renegotiations, but only for credit lines.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G2, G21, G23

• Bank Screening Heterogeneity

  Staff Working Paper 2016-56 Thibaut Duprey

  Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks’ abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G21, L, L1, L13

• Credit Risk and Collateral Demand in a Retail Payment System

  Staff Discussion Paper 2016-16 Héctor Pérez Saiz, Gabriel Xerri

  The recent financial crisis has led to the development of new regulations to control risk in designated payment systems, and the implementation of new credit risk management standards is one of the key issues. In this paper, we study various credit risk management schemes for the Canadian retail payment system (ACSS) that are designed to cover the exposure of a defaulting member.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C5, C58, G, G2, G21, G23