E49 - Other

• Consumer Credit with Over-optimistic Borrowers

  Staff Working Paper 2020-57 Florian Exler, Igor Livshits, James (Jim) C. MacGee, Michèle Tertilt

  When lenders cannot directly identify behavioural and rational borrowers, they use type scoring to track the likelihood of a borrower’s type. This leads to the partial pooling of borrowers, which results in rational borrowers subsidizing borrowing costs for behavioural borrowers. This, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of regulatory policies that target mistakes by behavioural borrowers.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credit and credit aggregates, Credit risk management, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E2, E21, E4, E49, G, G1, G18, K, K3, K35

• Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle

  Staff Working Paper 2005-1 Christian Calmès

  To properly account for the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables, researchers incorporate various internal-propagation mechanisms in their models.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models, Labour markets JEL Code(s): E, E1, E12, E4, E49, J, J3, J30, J31, J4, J41

• Poignée de main invisible et persistance des cycles économiques : une revue de la littérature

  Staff Working Paper 2003-40 Christian Calmès

  The author explains how self-enforcing labour contracts can enhance the performance of macroeconomic models. He exposes the benefits of using these dynamic contracts to account for some puzzling macroeconomic facts regarding the dynamics and persistence of employment, consumption and output.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models JEL Code(s): E, E1, E12, E4, E49, J, J3, J30, J31, J4, J41