On Thursday, May 30, 2024, Ron Morrow, Executive Director of Payments, Supervision and Oversight at the Bank of Canada, will speak at The Payments Canada SUMMIT.
Executive Director of Payments, Supervision and Oversight Ron Morrow talks about how payments have evolved in Canada and why it’s important to modernize our payment infrastructure.
Ron Morrow, Executive Director of Payments, Supervision and Oversight, talks about the evolution of payments in Canada, as well as the Bank’s new supervisory role for payment service providers.
We study how the interaction of market power and nominal price rigidity influences inflation dynamics. We find that pass-through declines with price stickiness when markets are concentrated, which implies a lower slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
We propose a tool that decomposes TFP growth into sectoral contributions. The analysis incorporates three structural factors—digitalization, aging and climate change policies—and measures their contributions. Overall, we expect that aggregate TFP growth will slow down in the 2020s below both its historical average and the average from the 2010s.
We examine systemic risks within the Canadian banking sector, decomposing them into three contribution channels: contagion, common exposures, and idiosyncratic risk. Through a structural model, we dissect how interbank relationships and market conditions contribute to systemic risk, providing new insights for financial stability.
What sources of financing do Indigenous-owned businesses in Canada use, and what are their expectations about prices, wages and inflation? We find Indigenous-owned firms are significantly less reliant on financial institutions as sources of financing compared with non-Indigenous firms. We also find Indigenous-owned firms have higher inflation expectations and weaker wage-growth expectations.
We study liquidity requirements in a framework with fire sales. The framework nests three common pricing mechanisms and produces the same observables. Absent risk-sharing considerations, the equilibrium is efficient with cash-in-the-market pricing; a liquidity requirement is optimal with second-best-use pricing; and a liquidity ceiling (i.e., a cap on liquid assets) is optimal with adverse selection.