

Price Setting when Expectations are Unanchored

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2024 Bank of Canada Annual Economic Conference

Motivation: in the Words of Bernanke (2007)

Long-run inflation expectations are not always anchored to central banks' objectives

“Long-run inflation expectations do vary over time. That is, they are not perfectly anchored in real economies; moreover, the extent to which they are anchored can change, depending on economic developments and (most important) the current and past conduct of monetary policy.”

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...What is the impact of expectations unanchoring on observed firms' pricing decisions?

... “Promising recent research has looked at price changes at very disaggregated levels for insight into the pricing decision (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2007). But this research has not yet linked pricing decisions at the microeconomic level to inflation expectations; undertaking that next step would no doubt be difficult but also very valuable.”

This Paper

Look at Brazilian economy: why?

1. Micro datasets on both *firms' prices* and *survey-based expectations*
2. Episode of persistent expectations' de-anchoring and subsequent re-anchoring

We find

- Significant increase in prices' response to exchange rate “shocks” in the unanchored regime
- Mechanism: calibrated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model replicates the empirical results quantitatively

De-Anchoring and Firm Pricing: Illustration

1. Pricing decision (individual firm). Optimal price under Calvo (ξ prob of not resetting price)

$$p_t = P_t + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} (\xi\beta)^j [(1 - \xi\beta)mc_{t+j} + \xi\beta\pi_{t+1+j}] \quad [\beta : \text{discount rate}]$$

depends on expected real marginal costs and the expected path of prices

2. Inflation expectations. Depend only on *perceived* CB inflation target $\pi_{t|t}^*$ [$\mathbb{E}_t(\text{Shocks}_{t+1}) = 0$]

Expectations formation. (Carvalho et al., 2023). Here simple extrapolation, for $j > 0$

$$\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+j} = \begin{cases} \pi_{t|t}^* \approx \pi_t^* = 0, & \text{Anchored} \\ \pi_{t|t}^* = \pi_{t|t-1}^* + \bar{g} (\pi_t - \pi_{t|t-1}^*), \quad \bar{g} \gg 0 & \text{Unanchored} \end{cases}$$

\implies Shocks to inflation (e.g. from exchange rate movements) affect long-run expectations

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Pricing response to inflation shocks (ε_t) Given same path for expected real marginal cost

$$p_t^{Unc} - p_t^{Anc} = \frac{\xi\beta}{1 - \xi\beta} (\pi_t - \pi_{t|t-1}^*) = \frac{\xi\beta}{1 - \xi\beta} \bar{g} \times \varepsilon_t$$

⇒ firms with unanchored expectation respond with a larger price change

⇒ firms with higher gain (\bar{g}) and price duration (ξ) should respond more

De-Anchoring and Firm Pricing: Brazilian Data (July 2008 to Dec. 2020)

1. Long-run Inflation expectations: $\mathbb{E}_t \pi_{t+j}$. **Focus Survey** [Details](#)

- High frequency (daily) survey: de-anchoring and re-anchoring of expectations (Bonomo et al, 2024)
- Sample period alternates between “anchored” and “unanchored” regimes

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2. Firm prices: p_t . **PPI microdata (IBRE-FGV)** [Details](#)

- Survey of firms from agriculture, mining, and manufacturing (310 “products” from 21 manf. “sectors”). Comprises 67.8% of PPI
- Use microdata with prices for individual items
- New BCB survey of firms’ forecasts: $\approx 80\%$ of firms look at **Focus Survey** to form expectations...


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3. The shock: ε_t . **Exchange rate**. Need *sizable* and *observable* “shock”
 - Follow international literature (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010)
 - Viewed as exogenous shifts to firms’ costs: instrumental variable approach


Monetary Policy U-Turn

Unexpected easing cycle: signal weaker central bank commitment to its inflation target

(a) Policy reversal



(b) Large market surprise



Bonomo et al (2024): \Rightarrow de-anchoring of long-term inflation expectations

Details


Long-Run Inflation Expectations in the Unanchored Regime

Bonomo et al (2024): Compared to “anchored” regime, long-run (4-yrs ahead) inflation expectations

1. Deviate significantly from *unchanged* inflation target [Details](#)
2. Twice as volatile [Details](#)
3. Significant pass-through from short-term expectations [Details](#)
4. Significant response to ‘monetary surprises’ [Details](#)

⇒ Long-run inflation expectations respond to economic shocks: $\pi_{t|t}^* = \pi_{t|t-1}^* + \bar{g} \times \varepsilon_t$, $\bar{g} \gg 0$

The Regimes



Re-anchoring: President Rouseff removed from office in May 2016;

⇒ Re-anchoring process completed in August 2016 (Carvalho and Nechio, 2023)

De-Anchoring and Firm Pricing: Empirical Strategy

Baseline regression:

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} \equiv p_{it} - p_{it-\tau_{it}} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t + \beta_2 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch} + \lambda_x x_{it} + \lambda_\tau x_{\tau_{it}} + \epsilon_{it}$$

τ_{it} : item i price spell that ends in period t

$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} \equiv p_{it} - p_{it-\tau_{it}}$: price change over that spell

$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \equiv e_t - e_{t-\tau_{it}}$: change in “exogenous” exchange rate over the life of that price spell

$\mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$: “Unanchored” regime indicator

$x_{it}, x_{\tau_{it}}$: control variables: [\[see below\]](#)

ϵ_{it} : error term.

Exogenous Exchange Rate?

Empirical pass-through literature: changes in exchange rate represent a shock to firms' costs

- Orthogonal to other shocks driving pricing decisions
- Not affected by firms' pricing

Do these assumptions hold here? Instrumental variable approach

First stage: $\Delta e_t = \theta_0 + \theta_1 \Delta S_t + \varepsilon_t$

where $\Delta S_t \equiv \frac{(\sum_{k=1}^7 \Delta s_{k,t})}{7}$: monthly variation of emerging markets currency (s_k) basket comprising 7 countries (Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Chile, China, India, South Africa)

Second stage:

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} \equiv p_{it} - p_{it-\tau_{it}} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta_{\tau_i} \hat{e}_t + \beta_2 \Delta_{\tau_i} \hat{e}_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch} + \lambda_x x_{it} + \lambda_\tau x_{\tau_{it}} + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $\Delta_{\tau_i} \hat{e}_t \equiv \hat{e}_t - \hat{e}_{t-\tau_{it}}$: change in instrumented exchange rate over the life of that price spell

De-Anchoring and Firm Pricing: Baseline Results

Dependent variable: $\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it}$	$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Nominal Exchange Rate			$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Instrumented FX		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.0410*** (0.00393)	0.0225*** (0.00545)	0.00822 (0.00568)	0.0855*** (0.00596)	0.0684*** (0.00812)	0.0566*** (0.00886)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$		0.0460*** (0.00805)	0.0322*** (0.00844)		0.0431*** (0.0115)	0.0243** (0.0120)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} - \tau_{it}$			-0.122*** (0.00521)			-0.123*** (0.00520)
τ_{it}			0.000359*** (0.0000974)			0.000244** (0.000101)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} UL C_t$			0.0289*** (0.00608)			0.0160*** (0.00618)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} Sectoral\ cost_t$			0.0347*** (0.0104)			0.0282*** (0.0103)
$Sectoral\ inventory_t$			-0.000177*** (0.0000184)			-0.000178*** (0.0000184)
$Sectoral\ demand_t$			0.000325*** (0.0000288)			0.000327*** (0.0000288)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0435*** (0.00245)	0.0428*** (0.00245)	0.00214 (0.00380)	0.0445*** (0.00245)	0.0441*** (0.00246)	0.00428 (0.00381)
N	192502	192502	178442	192502	192502	178442
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.049	0.065	0.0501	0.0502	0.0650
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

De-Anchoring and Firm Pricing: Robustness I (Exchange Rate)

Real rigidities (Gopinath et al., 2010)?

a. Lagged FX change Details

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t + \beta_2 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_{t-\tau_{it}} + (\beta_3 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t + \beta_4 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_{t-\tau_{it}}) \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch} + \text{controls} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Different behavior across regimes? Exchange rate

b. Non-linear FX effect Details

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t + \beta_2 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch} + \beta_3 (\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t)^2 + \text{controls} + \epsilon_{it}$$

c. Asymmetric FX effect Details:

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + (\beta_1^+ \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^+ + \beta_1^- \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^-) + (\beta_2^+ \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^+ + \beta_2^- \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^-) \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch} + \text{controls} + \epsilon_{it}$$

De-Anchoring and Firm Pricing: Robustness II (Inflation)

Larger price adjustments because inflation is higher?

d. Control for 12-months inflation Details

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t + \beta_2 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch} + \beta_3 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \pi_{t-1}^{12m} + \text{controls} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Alternative regime classification. $Unanch_t = \mathbb{E}_t[\pi_{t+s}] - \pi_{t+s}^T$ Degree of Anchoring

- $E_t[\pi_{t+s}]$: inflation expectation at time t for horizon $t + s$ (4 yrs)
- π_{t+s}^T : inflation target for $t + s$

e. Degree of anchoring Details

$$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it} \equiv p_{it} - p_{it-\tau_{it}} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \beta_1 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t + \beta_2 \Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times Unanch_t + \text{controls} + \epsilon_{it}$$

Model

- Standard new Keynesian model with imported inputs: source of exchange rate pass-through.
- Mechanism for unanchoring: inference about inflation target.
 - Agents' beliefs about target are more responsive to short-term monetary surprises \Rightarrow long-term expectations become more sensitive to exchange rate shocks, leading to higher pass-through.
- We calibrate model to Brazilian economy, simulate artificial data and run pass-through regressions analogous to empirical specifications.
- Quantitative results in line with our empirical findings.

Firms' Pricing Decision

- Firm (i) resetting the price

$$p_{i,t} = P_t + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{T=t}^{\infty} (\xi\beta)^{T-t} [(1 - \xi\beta)(mc_T - a_{i,T}) + \xi\beta\pi_{T+1}]$$

where aggregate marginal cost [Details](#)

$$mc_T = \zeta \left[\begin{array}{c} (1 - \alpha) \\ \underbrace{(e_t - P_t)}_{\text{real exch. rate: } P_t^* = 0} \\ -a_t + \alpha\eta y_t \end{array} \right] \quad [\zeta: \text{real rigidities.}]$$

- Exchange rate and pricing decisions:
 - Nominal exchange rate: $e_t = \rho_e e_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^e \Rightarrow$ **cost-push shock**
 - Direct cost effect of exchange rate through imported inputs.
 - **Equilibrium effects through expectations.**

Central Bank and Expectation (Un)Anchoring

- Taylor rule:

$$R_t = \rho R_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) [\phi_\pi (\pi_t - \pi_t^*) + \phi_y y_t] + \varepsilon_t^R$$

- Inflation target:

$$\pi_t^* = \rho_{\pi^*} \pi_{t-1}^* + \varepsilon_t^*.$$

- Learning about π_t^* :

① Agents cannot separately identify ε_t^R and π_t^*

② Signal extraction problem: Kalman filter

- Monetary policy shock: $\varepsilon_t^R = -\tau_e \varepsilon_t^e + \varepsilon_t^m$, τ “small” \rightarrow accommodate exchange rate depreciation

- Bounded rationality: agents are ‘know the model’ but assume $\text{Cov}(\varepsilon_t^R, \varepsilon_t^e) = 0$

Central Bank and Expectation (Un)Anchoring

- Monetary shocks and anchoring

$$\tilde{\pi}_t = \pi_t^* - \frac{1}{(1 - \rho_i)\phi_\pi} \varepsilon_{R,t}, [\text{Signal}]$$

$$\pi_{t+1|t}^* = \rho_{\pi_*} \pi_{t|t-1}^* + \bar{g} \left(\tilde{\pi}_t - \pi_{t|t-1}^* \right) [\text{Update}]$$

- Kalman gain: $\bar{g} > 0$

1. $\bar{g}^{\text{Anchored}}$ (small): reflects correct signal-to-noise ratio from DGP of π_t^* and $\varepsilon_{R,t}$

2. $\bar{g}^{\text{Unanchored}} \gg \bar{g}^{\text{Anchored}}$: higher **perceived** volatility in the inflation target

- Exchange rate and anchoring: link between ε_t^e to **long-run inflation expectations**

$$\pi_{t+1|t}^* = (\rho_{\pi_*} - \bar{g}) \pi_{t|t-1}^* + \bar{g} \times \frac{1}{(1 - \rho) \phi_\pi} \tau_e \varepsilon_t^e$$

Model Calibration

- Model calibrated to Brazilian economy. [Details](#)
 - Key target: *relative expectations' vol across regimes*.
 - Price response to exchange rate is untargeted
- We simulate the model, sample a panel of 5800 firms over 156 months (sample period)
- Assume windows of anchored/unanchored/anchored expectations as in the data, and run pass-through regressions analogous to empirical specifications.
- Monte Carlo experiment: perform 1000 replications and look at the mean regression outcomes.

Pass-Through Regressions with Model-Generated Data

	Model-generated data		PPI data	
Dependent variable: $\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it}$	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.048	0.058	0.0586***	0.0653***
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$	0.021	0.022	0.0351***	0.0286***
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_{t-\tau_{it}}$		0.012		0.0244***
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_{t-\tau_{it}} \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$		0.002		0.0386***
$\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it-\tau_{it}}$	-0.138	-0.139	-0.109***	-0.112***
N	174,357	174,357	178,442	172,850
Individual Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Time-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	No	No

Conclusions

- Present evidence that long-run inflation expectations matter for individual pricing decisions
- Passthrough from exchange rate shocks is considerably higher in the “Unanchored” regime
- We develop and calibrate a model in which expectations can become unanchored. Model provides structural interpretation for empirical findings

Focus Survey

- Professional forecasters covering many macroeconomic variables; commercial banks, asset managers, consulting firms and (a few) non-financial firms.
 - Unbalanced panel, approximately 300 participants over time.
 - Currently, 130-140 participants. Around 100 participants update their nowcasts and forecasts frequently (Gaglianone and Issler, 2021).
- System available **daily** for updates. BCB makes daily data available.
- We use inflation forecasts for various horizons and for the SELIC policy rate.
 - Both aggregate and individual forecasts data.
- Longer horizons: calendar years. Fixed horizons by simple interpolation.

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
PPI Microdata

- Survey of firms from agriculture, mining, and manufacturing.
 - Sector (CNAE 3.0): set of products in the same sector. E.g. Textile products.
 - Product (CNAE 2.0): set of items classified as being from the same product. Level at which weights are available. E.g. Cotton fabrics.
 - Item: most disaggregated level, individual prices; includes company, model, size, brand, packaging, city etc.
- Summary

	Total	Monthly average	
	Raw data*	Raw data*	Price changes
Items	14,164	5,796	1,501
Firms	2,633	1,695	502
Products	310	310	310
Sectors	21	21	21
Price Quotes	883,782		

*Raw data refers to the dataset treated for outliers and missing values. Unbalanced panel, some items are missing in any given month.

Daily Data: monetary policy caused unanchoring



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Expectations deviate meaningfully from target

Dependent variable	$E[\pi_{13-24} - \pi_{13-24}^T]$	$E[\pi_{25-36} - \pi_{25-36}^T]$	$E[\pi_{37-48} - \pi_{37-48}^T]$
$\mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$	1.033*** (0.006)	0.677*** (0.006)	0.532*** (0.007)
$(1 - \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch})$	0.0356*** (0.003)	0.0156*** (0.002)	-0.0379*** (0.003)
Observations	23,111	20,950	16,218
Adjusted R^2	0.709	0.536	0.387
p-value for H0: $\beta_{Unanch} = \beta_{Anch}$	0	0	0
Estimation method	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS

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Expectations become more volatile

Dependent variable	$\sigma_{iJ} (E\pi_{1-12} - \pi_{1-12}^T)$	$\sigma_{iJ} (E\pi_{13-24} - \pi_{13-24}^T)$	$\sigma_{iJ} (E\pi_{25-36} - \pi_{25-36}^T)$	$\sigma_{iJ} (E\pi_{37-48} - \pi_{37-48}^T)$
$\mathbf{1}_t^{Unanch}$	0.533*** (0.0194)	0.429*** (0.0187)	0.398*** (0.0228)	0.363*** (0.0241)
$(1 - \mathbf{1}_t^{Unanch})$	0.423*** (0.0129)	0.190*** (0.00844)	0.138*** (0.00771)	0.155*** (0.00888)
Observations	276	287	277	265
Adjusted R^2	0.870	0.808	0.737	0.692
p-value for $H_0: \beta_{Unanch} = \beta_{Anch}$	0	0	0	0
Estimation	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS	Pooled OLS

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Sensitivity of long- to short-run expectations increases

Table: Expectations passthrough regressions – between Focus “contest dates”

Dependent variable	$\Delta E_i [\pi_{25-36} - \pi_{25-36}^T]$	$\Delta E_i [\pi_{37-48} - \pi_{37-48}^T]$
$\Delta E_i [\pi_{1-12} - \pi_{1-12}^T] \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$	0.228*** (0.0399)	0.175*** (0.0345)
$\Delta E_i [\pi_{1-12} - \pi_{1-12}^T] \times (1 - \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch})$	0.0214 (0.0169)	0.0151 (0.0220)
<i>Constant</i>	-0.00172 (0.00371)	-0.00215 (0.00370)
Observations	2,841	2,461
Adjusted R^2	0.0457	0.0242
Estimation method	Fixed effects	Fixed effects
Individual fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No

Sensitivity of inflation expectations to interest rate surprises


Dependent variable	One day after policy meetings		
	$\Delta E_i [\pi_{13-24} - \pi_{13-24}^T]$	$\Delta E_i [\pi_{25-36} - \pi_{25-36}^T]$	$\Delta E_i [\pi_{37-48} - \pi_{37-48}^T]$
<i>Abrupt U-turn surprise</i>	-0.939*** (0.184)	-0.852** (0.363)	-0.637 (0.498)
<i>Other surprises</i> $\times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$	-0.640*** (0.161)	-0.531*** (0.152)	-0.308* (0.173)
<i>Other surprises</i> $\times (1 - \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch})$	-0.0822 (0.0547)	-0.0300 (0.0506)	-0.0413 (0.0955)
<i>Constant</i>	0.0203** (0.00794)	0.0155* (0.00812)	0.0120 (0.0112)
Observations	509	471	333
Adjusted R^2	0.208	0.149	0.00974
Estimation method	Fixed effects	Fixed effects	Fixed effects
Individual fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-fixed effects	No	No	No

Pass-through regression with lagged FX change

Dependent variable: $\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it}$	$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Nominal Exchange Rate			$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Instrumented FX		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.0420*** (0.00430)	0.0128** (0.00650)	0.00370 (0.00667)	0.0865*** (0.00678)	0.0561*** (0.0102)	0.0507*** (0.0110)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_{t-\tau_{it}}$	0.0120*** (0.00348)	-0.000287 (0.00468)	0.00251 (0.00467)	0.0223*** (0.00510)	0.0110* (0.00657)	0.0202*** (0.00686)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$		0.0618*** (0.00896)	0.0513*** (0.00898)		0.0623*** (0.0131)	0.0513*** (0.0131)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_{t-\tau_{it}} \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$		0.0277*** (0.00676)	0.0375*** (0.00672)		0.0276*** (0.00954)	0.0357*** (0.00968)
N	178973	178973	172850	178973	178973	172850
Adjusted R^2	0.047	0.047	0.064	0.0471	0.0474	0.0642
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Exchange rate: Unanchoring or non-linearity?

Figure: USDBRL and anchored/unanchored regimes



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Unanchoring or non-linearity?

	$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Nominal Exchange Rate					$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Instrumented FX				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.0410*** (0.00393)	0.0225*** (0.00545)	0.0315*** (0.00495)	0.0193*** (0.00582)	0.00989 (0.00602)	0.0855*** (0.00596)	0.0684*** (0.00812)	0.0787*** (0.00796)	0.0659*** (0.00919)	0.0592*** (0.00968)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$		0.0460*** (0.00805)		0.0425*** (0.00834)	0.0337*** (0.00853)		0.0431*** (0.0115)		0.0417*** (0.0117)	0.0252** (0.0121)
$(\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t)^2$			0.0455*** (0.0163)	0.0220 (0.0170)	-0.0135 (0.0188)			0.0400 (0.0361)	0.0179 (0.0370)	-0.0232 (0.0422)
N	192502	192502	192502	192502	178442	192502	192502	192502	192502	178442
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.065	0.0501	0.0502	0.0501	0.0502	0.0650
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes

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Unanchoring or asymmetric response to FX?

	$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Nominal Exchange Rate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.0410*** (0.00393)		0.0225*** (0.00545)	0.00822 (0.00568)		
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^{app}$		0.00792 (0.00964)			0.00709 (0.0103)	0.0108 (0.0112)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^{dep}$		0.0531*** (0.00501)			0.0310*** (0.00730)	0.00692 (0.00819)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$			0.0460*** (0.00805)	0.0322*** (0.00844)		
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^{app} \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$					0.0264 (0.0268)	0.00626 (0.0274)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t^{dep} \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$					0.0423*** (0.00948)	0.0357*** (0.00971)
N	192502	192502	192502	178442	192502	178442
Adjusted R^2	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.065	0.050	0.065
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes


Unanchoring or higher 12m inflation?

	$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Nominal Exchange Rate					$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Instrumented FX				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.0410*** (0.00393)	0.0225*** (0.00545)	-0.0142 (0.0105)	-0.000444 (0.0116)	-0.0284** (0.0122)	0.0855*** (0.00596)	0.0684*** (0.00812)	0.00945 (0.0166)	0.0129 (0.0179)	-0.0123 (0.0192)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \mathbb{1}_t^{Unanch}$		0.0460*** (0.00805)		0.0283** (0.0120)	0.00358 (0.0128)		0.0431*** (0.0115)		0.00684 (0.0157)	-0.0211 (0.0168)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times \pi_{t-1}^{12m}$			0.00891*** (0.00154)	0.00485** (0.00230)	0.00763*** (0.00242)			0.0125*** (0.00255)	0.0115*** (0.00348)	0.0140*** (0.00371)
N	192502	192502	192502	192502	178442	192502	192502	192502	192502	178442
Adjusted R^2	0.0492	0.0495	0.0495	0.0495	0.0646	0.0501	0.0502	0.0502	0.0502	0.0651
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes

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A measure of the degree of unanchoring

Figure: Anchored/unanchored regimes and degree of unanchoring



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Pass-through regression with degree of unanchoring

Dependent variable: $\Delta_{\tau_i} p_{it}$	$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Nominal Exchange Rate			$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$ - Instrumented FX		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t$	0.0410*** (0.00393)	0.0195*** (0.00521)	0.00755 (0.00542)	0.0855*** (0.00596)	0.0637*** (0.00775)	0.0541*** (0.00850)
$\Delta_{\tau_i} e_t \times Unanch_t$		0.109*** (0.0149)	0.0700*** (0.0157)		0.107*** (0.0196)	0.0613*** (0.0204)
N	192502	192502	178442	192502	192502	178442
Adjusted R^2	0.0492	0.0496	0.0646	0.0501	0.0503	0.0650
Individual Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time-Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Items/Sectors Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

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Firms' technology and pricing

- Firm i 's output Y_{it} :

$$Y_{it} = A_{it} \left(L_{it}^{\eta} I_{it}^{1-\eta} \right)^{\alpha} M_{it}^{(1-\alpha)},$$

L_{it} : labor

I_{it} : domestic intermediate inputs (source of real rigidities)

M_{it} : imported input

A_{it} : productivity (firm-specific and aggregate).

- Firm i 's real marginal cost:

$$MC_{it} \propto A_{it}^{-1} \omega_t^{\alpha\eta} q_t^{1-\alpha},$$

ω_t : real wage

q_t : real exchange rate. [Partial equilibrium approach: constant foreign price level]

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Calibration Results

Parameters	Description	Parameters	Description
$1 - \alpha$	import elasticity	0.050	
β	discount rate	0.995	
$1 - \xi$	freq. Δp^i	0.200	
$1 - \eta$	interm. inputs	0.200	
ϕ_π	TR: $\pi_t - \pi_t^*$	1.284	
ϕ_y	TR: y_t	0.005	
ρ_i	TR: R_{t-1}	0.875	
$\hat{g}^{Unanchored}$	Kalman gain	0.127	
$\hat{g}^{Anchored}$	Kalman gain	0.008	
Moments	Model	Data	
$\sigma(\pi_t)$	0.421	0.300	
$\sigma(R_t)$	0.203	0.260	
$\sigma(e_t)$	8.603	8.720	
$\sigma(\hat{y}_t)$	2.385	2.400	
$\sigma(\mathbb{E}^{Anc} \pi)$:	0.162	0.160	
$\sigma(\mathbb{E}^{Unanc} \pi)$:	0.367	0.360	
$\rho(\pi_t, \pi_{t-1})$:	0.696	0.570	
$\rho(R_t, R_{t-1})$:	0.810	0.950	
$\rho(\hat{y}_t, \hat{y}_{t-1})$:	0.663	0.820	
$\rho(e_t, e_{t-1})$:	0.867	0.867	
$\mathbb{E}(\Delta p_t^i)$:	6.179	6.000	

*: fixed