David Cimon - Latest
-
-
Crowdfunding and Risk
Crowdfunding may enable unique products to reach the consumer market. I model a crowdfunding technology that publicly screens consumer demand early in the production process. In this model, entrepreneurs like crowdfunding for risky projects where demand is uncertain, but not for large, safe projects or for projects where production costs are uncertain. -
Cyber Risk and Security Investment
We develop a principal-agent model of cyber-attacking with fee-paying clients who delegate security decisions to financial platforms. We derive testable implications about clients’ vulnerability to cyber attacks and about the fees charged. -
Fixed-income dealing and central bank interventions
We summarize the theoretical model of central bank asset purchases developed in Cimon and Walton (2022). The model helps us understand how asset purchases ease pressures on investment dealers to restore market conditions in a crisis. -
Central Bank Liquidity Facilities and Market Making
We create a theoretical model of central bank asset purchases. The model helps explain how, in a crisis, these purchases ease pressures on investment dealers. -
Order Flow Segmentation, Liquidity and Price Discovery: The Role of Latency Delays
Latency delays—known as “speed bumps”—are an intentional slowing of order flow by exchanges. Supporters contend that delays protect market makers from high-frequency arbitrage, while opponents warn that delays promote “quote fading” by market makers. We construct a model of informed trading in a fragmented market, where one market operates a conventional order book and the other imposes a latency delay on market orders. -
Banking Regulation and Market Making
We model how securities dealers respond to regulations on leverage, position and liquidity such as those imposed by the Basel III framework. We show that while asset prices exhibit greater price impact, bid-ask spreads do not change and trading volumes may even increase. -
Broker Routing Decisions in Limit Order Markets
The primary focus of this paper is to study conflict of interest in the brokerage market. Brokers face a conflict of interest when the commissions they receive from investors differ from the costs imposed by different trading venues.