Payment clearing and settlement systems

• Losses from Simulated Defaults in Canada's Large Value Transfer System

  Staff Discussion Paper 2010-14 Nellie Zhang, Tom Hossfeld

  The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) loss-sharing mechanism was designed to ensure that, in the event of a one-participant default, the collateral pledged by direct members of the system would be sufficient to cover the largest possible net debit position of a defaulting participant. However, the situation may not hold if the indirect effects of the defaults are taken into consideration, or if two participants default during the same payment cycle.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E47, G, G2, G21

• Central Bank Haircut Policy

  Staff Working Paper 2010-23 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Miguel Molico

  We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Central bank research, Financial services, Financial system regulation and policies, Monetary policy implementation, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E40, E5, E50