Economic models

• Securitization under Asymmetric Information over the Business Cycle

  Staff Working Paper 2015-9 Martin Kuncl

  This paper studies the efficiency of financial intermediation through securitization in a model with heterogeneous investment projects and asymmetric information about the quality of securitized assets. I show that when retaining part of the risk, the issuer of securitized assets may credibly signal its quality.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credit and credit aggregates, Economic models, Financial markets, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G20

• Information, Risk Sharing and Incentives in Agency Problems

  Staff Working Paper 2015-7 Jia Xie

  This paper studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or completely taken care of by a contract on the outcome.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): D, D8