D44 - Auctions

• Entry and Exit in Treasury Auctions

  Staff Working Paper 2024-29 Jason Allen, Ali Hortaçsu, Eric Richert, Milena Wittwer

  This paper introduces and estimates a structural model of the Canadian primary market for government debt. We assess the role of dealer exit in this market as a key reason for increased, yet irregular, customer entry and quantify the benefits of greater customer competition against the costs of higher market volatility.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial institutions, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D47, G, G1, G12, G2, G28

• Intermediary Market Power and Capital Constraints

  Staff Working Paper 2023-51 Jason Allen, Milena Wittwer

  We examine how intermediary capitalization affects asset prices in a framework that allows for intermediary market power. We introduce a model in which capital-constrained intermediaries buy or trade an asset in an imperfectly competitive market, and we show that weaker capital constraints lead to both higher prices and intermediary markups.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D40, D44, G, G1, G12, G18, G2, G20, L, L1, L10

• Estimating the Slope of the Demand Function at Auctions for Government of Canada Bonds

  Staff Discussion Paper 2023-12 Bo Young Chang

  We use bid data from Government of Canada bond auctions between 1999 and 2021 to gauge the yield sensitivity of these bonds to the issuance amount. Our new metric estimates the demand function of the bidders at each auction and offers insights into the relationship between supply and yield of government bonds.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Debt management, Interest rates JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, G, G1, G12

• Maturity Composition and the Demand for Government Debt

  Staff Working Paper 2020-29 Jason Allen, Jakub Kastl, Milena Wittwer

  The main objectives of debt management are to raise stable and low-cost funding to meet the government’s financial needs and to maintain a well-functioning market for government securities.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, D, D4, D44, E, E5, E58, G, G1, G12

• Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design

  Staff Working Paper 2019-30 Jason Allen, Robert Clark, Brent Hickman, Eric Richert

  Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Financial institutions JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, G, G2, G21

• The Cost of the Government Bond Buyback and Switch Programs in Canada

  Staff Analytical Note 2018-41 Bo Young Chang, Jun Yang, Parker Liu

  This note examines the costs of the Government of Canada bond buyback and switch programs between 1998 and 2016. Our analysis indicates that the auction design of the buyback program was effective in retiring government debt with minimal costs resulting from bid shading in auctions and price impact.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff analytical notes Topic(s): Debt management JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44

• Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity

  Staff Working Paper 2016-23 Serafin Grundl, Yu Zhu

  This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods JEL Code(s): C, C1, C14, C5, C57, D, D4, D44, L, L0, L00

• Comparison of Auction Formats in Canadian Government Auctions

  Staff Working Paper 2009-5 Olivier Armantier, Nourredine Lafhel

  Using a rich sample of Canadian government securities auctions, we estimate the structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders. We find little evidence of asymmetries between participants at Canadian government nominal bond auctions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Debt management, Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, D44, D6, D63, G, G2, G28