C57 - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
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Testing Collusion and Cooperation in Binary Choice Games
This paper studies the testable implication of players’ collusive or cooperative behaviour in a binary choice game with complete information. I illustrate the implementation of this test by revisiting the entry game between Walmart and Kmart. -
Nonparametric Identification of Incomplete Information Discrete Games with Non-equilibrium Behaviors
This paper jointly relaxes two assumptions in the literature that estimates games. These two assumptions are the parametric restriction on the model primitives and the restriction of equilibrium behaviors. Without imposing the above two assumptions, this paper identifies the primitives of the game. -
Monetary Payoff and Utility Function in Adaptive Learning Models
When players repeatedly face an identical or similar game (e.g., coordination game, technology adoption game, or product choice game), they may learn through experience to perform better in the future. This learning behaviour has important economic implications. -
Resolving Failed Banks: Uncertainty, Multiple Bidding & Auction Design
Bank resolution is costly. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) typically resolves failing banks by auction. -
Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours
This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions. -
Identification and Estimation of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions with Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity
This paper shows point identification in first-price auction models with risk aversion and unobserved auction heterogeneity by exploiting multiple bids from each auction and variation in the number of bidders. The required exclusion restriction is shown to be consistent with a large class of entry models.