Posts
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March 21, 2022
Operational details for upcoming secondary market purchases of Government of Canada securities (March 28-April 8)
As previously announced, the Bank of Canada (the Bank) launched on April 1, 2020 a program to purchase Government of Canada securities in the secondary market – the Government Bond Purchase Program (GBPP). -
Vertical Bargaining and Obfuscation
Is obscuring prices always bad for consumers? The answer depends on the market structure and on the negotiating power between manufacturers and retailers. -
COVID-19, Containment and Consumption
We assess the impact of COVID-19 on consumption indicators by estimating the effects of government-mandated containment measures and of the willingness of individuals to voluntarily physically distance to prevent contagion. -
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March 16, 2022
Bank of Canada and Massachusetts Institute of Technology announce joint Central Bank Digital Currency collaboration
The Bank of Canada and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) today announced an agreement to collaborate on a twelve-month research project on Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). -
Household Heterogeneity and the Performance of Monetary Policy Frameworks
Consumption inequality and a low interest rate environment are two important trends in today’s economy. But the implications they may have—and how those implications interact—within different monetary policy frameworks are not well understood. We study the ranking of alternative frameworks that take these trends into account. -
March 7, 2022
Operational details for upcoming secondary market purchases of Government of Canada securities (March 14-25)
As previously announced, the Bank of Canada (the Bank) launched on April 1, 2020 a program to purchase Government of Canada securities in the secondary market – the Government Bond Purchase Program (GBPP). -
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The Central Bank Strikes Back! Credibility of Monetary Policy under Fiscal Influence
Central banks in many advanced economies enjoy a high degree of independence, which protects monetary policy decisions from political influence. But how should independent central banks react if pressured by fiscal policy-makers? We examine whether a central bank should design a monetary policy framework that prescribes acting conditionally on how fiscal policy behaves.