L - Industrial Organization
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PayTech and the D(ata) N(etwork) A(ctivities) of BigTech Platforms
Why do BigTech platforms introduce payment services? We explore this using a model in which a monopoly platform faces a trade-off between the costs associated with privacy concerns and the revenue from data services. We then analyze the feedback effects between data and payments. -
Fixed-income dealing and central bank interventions
We summarize the theoretical model of central bank asset purchases developed in Cimon and Walton (2022). The model helps us understand how asset purchases ease pressures on investment dealers to restore market conditions in a crisis. -
Addictive Platforms
We study competition for consumer attention, in which platforms can sacrifice service quality for attention. A platform can choose the “addictiveness” of its service. -
Equilibrium in Two-Sided Markets for Payments: Consumer Awareness and the Welfare Cost of the Interchange Fee
We construct and estimate a structural two-stage model of equilibrium in a market for payments in order to quantify the network externalities and identify the main determinants of consumer and merchant decisions. -
Vertical Bargaining and Obfuscation
Is obscuring prices always bad for consumers? The answer depends on the market structure and on the negotiating power between manufacturers and retailers. -
Central Bank Liquidity Facilities and Market Making
We create a theoretical model of central bank asset purchases. The model helps explain how, in a crisis, these purchases ease pressures on investment dealers.