December 31, 2021
Staff research
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Best Before? Expiring Central Bank Digital Currency and Loss Recovery
We consider introducing an expiry date for offline digital currency balances. Consumers whose digital cash expired would automatically receive the funds back into their online account. This functionality could increase demand for digital cash, with the time to expiry playing a key role. -
News-Driven International Credit Cycles
This paper examines the implications of positive news about future asset values that turn out to be incorrect at a later date in an open economy model with banking. The model captures the patterns of bank credit and current account dynamics in Spain between 2000 and 2010. The model finds that the use of unconventional policies leads to a milder bust. -
Predicting the Demand for Central Bank Digital Currency: A Structural Analysis with Survey Data
How much of a CBDC would Canadian households want to hold, and what design features of a CBDC would they care about? -
Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Payments Modernization: the Case of the Large-Value Payment System
Canada is undertaking a major initiative to modernize its payments ecosystem. The modernized ecosystem is expected to bring significant benefits to Canadian financial markets and the overall economy. We develop an empirical framework to quantify the economic benefits of modernizing the payment system in Canada. -
Central Bank Digital Currency and Banking: Macroeconomic Benefits of a Cash-Like Design
Should a CBDC be more like cash or bank deposits? An interest-bearing, cash-like CBDC not only makes payments more efficient but also increases total demand. This has positive effects on other transactions, inducing more deposit taking and lending and, thus, bank intermediation. -
Revisiting the Monetary Sovereignty Rationale for CBDCs
One argument for central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) is that without them, private and foreign digital monies could displace domestic currencies, threatening the central bank’s monetary policy and lender of last resort capabilities. I revisit this monetary sovereignty rationale and offer a wider view—one that considers a broader set of currency functions and captures important cross-country variation.