E4 - Money and Interest Rates

• Monetary Policy Spillover to Small Open Economies: Is the Transmission Different under Low Interest Rates?

  Staff Working Paper 2021-62 Jin Cao, Valeriya Dinger, Tomás Gómez, Zuzana Gric, Martin Hodula, Alejandro Jara, Ragnar Juelsrud, Karolis Liaudinskas, Simona Malovaná, Yaz Terajima

  Does the transmission of monetary policy change when interest rates are low or negative? We shed light on this question by analyzing the international bank lending channels of monetary policy using regulatory data on banks from four small open economies: Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic and Norway.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, International topics, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E4, E43, E5, E52, E58, F, F3, F34, F4, F42, G, G2, G21, G28

• Democratic Political Economy of Financial Regulation

  Staff Working Paper 2021-59 Igor Livshits, Youngmin Park

  We offer a theory of how inefficiently lax financial regulation could arise in a democratic society.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Housing, Interest rates JEL Code(s): E, E4, E43, E44, G, G0, G01, G2, G21, G28, P, P4, P48

• Discount Rates, Debt Maturity, and the Fiscal Theory

  Staff Working Paper 2021-58 Alexandre Corhay, Thilo Kind, Howard Kung, Gonzalo Morales

  Do bond risk premiums influence the effects of debt maturity operations? Using a model with realistic bond risk premiums, we show that maturity operations have sizable effects on expected inflation and output when the central bank passively responds to inflation and the fiscal authority weakly responds to the debt level.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Interest rates, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): E, E4, E43, E44, E6, E63, G, G1, G12

• Are Bank Bailouts Welfare Improving?

  Staff Working Paper 2021-56 Malik Shukayev, Alexander Ueberfeldt

  Financial sector bailouts, while potentially beneficial during a crisis, might lead to excessive risk taking if anticipated. Taking expectations and aggregate risk implications into account, we show that bailouts can be welfare improving, but only if capital adequacy constraints are sufficiently tight.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): D, D6, D62, E, E3, E32, E4, E44, G, G0, G01