Staff working papers

• Limiting Sender’s Information in Bayesian Persuasion

  Staff Working Paper 2019-10 Shota Ichihashi

  This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D83

• Inflation Targeting and Liquidity Traps Under Endogenous Credibility

  Staff Working Paper 2019-9 Cars Hommes, Joep Lustenhouwer

  Policy implications are derived for an inflation-targeting central bank, whose credibility is endogenous and depends on its past ability to achieve its targets. This is done in a New Keynesian framework with heterogeneous and boundedly rational expectations.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credibility, Monetary policy JEL Code(s): C, C6, C62, E, E3, E32, E5, E52

• Macroprudential Policy with Capital Buffers

  Staff Working Paper 2019-8 Josef Schroth

  The countercyclical capital buffer is part of Basel III, the set of regulatory measures developed in response to the financial crisis of 2007–09. This study focuses on how time-varying capital buffers can address inefficiencies in economies with endogenous financial crises.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Credit and credit aggregates, Credit risk management, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Lender of last resort JEL Code(s): E, E1, E13, E3, E32, E4, E44

• Inequality in Parental Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Optimal Higher Education Subsidies

  Staff Working Paper 2019-7 Youngmin Park

  This paper studies optimal education subsidies when parental transfers are unequally distributed across students and cannot be publicly observed. After documenting substantial inequality in parental transfers among US college students with similar family resources, I examine its implications for how the education subsidy should vary with schooling level and family resources to minimize inefficiencies generated by borrowing constraints.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Fiscal policy, Potential output, Productivity JEL Code(s): D, D1, D14, D6, D61, D64, D8, D82, I, I2, I22, J, J2, J24