Staff working papers

• Limited Commitment, Endogenous Credibility and the Challenges of Price-level Targeting

  Staff Working Paper 2018-61 Gino Cateau, Malik Shukayev

  This paper studies the cost of limited commitment when a central bank has the discretion to adjust policy whenever the costs of honoring its past commitments become high. Specifically, we consider a central bank that seeks to implement optimal policy in a New Keynesian model by committing to a price-level target path.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credibility, Inflation targets, Monetary policy framework JEL Code(s): E, E3, E31, E5, E52

• Inference in Games Without Nash Equilibrium: An Application to Restaurants’ Competition in Opening Hours

  Staff Working Paper 2018-60 Erhao Xie

  This paper relaxes the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) assumption commonly imposed in empirical discrete choice games with incomplete information. Instead of assuming that players have unbiased/correct expectations, my model treats a player’s belief about the behavior of other players as an unrestricted unknown function. I study the joint identification of belief and payoff functions.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C5, C57, L, L1, L13, L8, L85

• The Role of Corporate Saving over the Business Cycle: Shock Absorber or Amplifier?

  Staff Working Paper 2018-59 Xiaodan Gao, Shaofeng Xu

  We document countercyclical corporate saving behavior with the degree of countercyclicality varying nonmonotonically with firm size. We then develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to explain the pattern and study its implications for business cycles.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models JEL Code(s): E, E2, E20, E22, E3, E32, G, G3, G31, G32

• Should the Central Bank Issue E-money?

  Staff Working Paper 2018-58 Charles M. Kahn, Francisco Rivadeneyra, Tsz-Nga Wong

  Should a central bank take over the provision of e-money, a circulable electronic liability? We discuss how e-money technology changes the tradeoff between public and private provision, and the tradeoff between e-money and a central bank's existing liabilities like bank notes and reserves.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E51, E58