D - Microeconomics

• Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

  Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov

  Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61

• Repo Market Functioning when the Interest Rate Is Low or Negative

  Staff Discussion Paper 2017-3 Jean-Sébastien Fontaine, James Hately, Adrian Walton

  This paper investigates how a low or negative overnight interest rate might affect the Canadian repo markets. The main conclusion is that the repo market for general collateral will continue to function effectively.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Interest rates, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): D, D4, G, G1, G10, G12