FSRC - Financial System Research Center

• Adoption Costs of Financial Innovation: Evidence from Italian ATM Cards

  Staff Working Paper 2017-8 Kim Huynh, Philipp Schmidt-Dengler, Gregor W. Smith, Angelika Welte

  The discrete choice to adopt a financial innovation affects a household’s exposure to inflation and transactions costs. We model this adoption decision as being subject to an unobserved cost.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Econometric and statistical methods, Financial services JEL Code(s): C, C3, C35, D, D1, D14, E, E4, E41

• Banking Regulation and Market Making

  Staff Working Paper 2017-7 David Cimon, Corey Garriott

  We model how securities dealers respond to regulations on leverage, position and liquidity such as those imposed by the Basel III framework. We show that while asset prices exhibit greater price impact, bid-ask spreads do not change and trading volumes may even increase.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Financial system regulation and policies, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): G, G1, G14, G2, G20, L, L1, L10

• Optimal Capital Regulation

  Staff Working Paper 2017-6 Stéphane Moyen, Josef Schroth

  We study constrained-efficient bank capital regulation in a model with market-imposed equity requirements. Banks hold equity buffers to insure against sudden loss of access to funding. However, in the model, banks choose to only partially self-insure because equity is privately costly.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Credit and credit aggregates, Financial institutions, Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies JEL Code(s): E, E1, E13, E3, E32, E4, E44

• Canadian Bank Notes and Dominion Notes: Lessons for Digital Currencies

  Staff Working Paper 2017-5 Ben Fung, Scott Hendry, Warren E. Weber

  This paper studies the period in Canada when both private bank notes and government-issued notes (Dominion notes) were simultaneously in circulation. Because both of these notes shared many of the characteristics of today's digital currencies, the experience with these notes can be used to draw lessons about how digital currencies might perform.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Bank notes, Digital currencies and fintech, Financial services JEL Code(s): E, E4, E41, E42, E5, E58

• Stability and Efficiency in Decentralized Two‐Sided Markets with Weak Preferences

  Staff Working Paper 2017-4 Radoslav Raykov

  Many decentralized markets are able to attain a stable outcome despite the absence of a central authority (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990). A stable matching, however, need not be efficient if preferences are weak. This raises the question whether a decentralized market with weak preferences can attain Pareto efficiency in the absence of a central matchmaker.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C7, C78, D, D6, D61