D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

• Risk Sharing in the Presence of a Public Good

  Staff Working Paper 2015-27 Josef Schroth

  This paper studies an economy where agents can spend resources on consuming a private good and on funding a public good. There is asymmetric information regarding agents’ relative preference for private versus public good consumption.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial stability, Financial system regulation and policies, Fiscal policy JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, D86, E, E6, E62, H, H2, H21, H23, H7, H77

• Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation

  Staff Working Paper 2015-25 Josef Schroth

  I build a model of optimal managerial compensation where managers each have a privately observed propensity to manipulate short-term stock prices.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Economic models, Labour markets, Recent economic and financial developments JEL Code(s): D, D8, D82, G, G1, G14, G3, G30, M, M1, M12