Staff research

• July 31, 2014

  Research Update - July 2014

  This monthly newsletter features the latest research publications by Bank of Canada economists including external publications and working papers published on the Bank of Canada’s website.

  Content Type(s): Research newsletters

• Analyzing and Forecasting the Canadian Economy through the LENS Model

  Technical Report No. 102 Olivier Gervais, Marc-André Gosselin

  The authors describe the key features of a new large-scale Canadian macroeconomic forecasting model developed over the past two years at the Bank of Canada.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Technical reports Topic(s): Econometric and statistical methods, Economic models JEL Code(s): C, C5, C53, E, E1, E17, E2, E27, E3, E37, F, F1, F17

• Removal of the Unwinding Provisions in the Automated Clearing Settlement System: A Risk Assessment

  Staff Discussion Paper 2014-4 Nicholas Labelle, Varya Taylor

  A default in the Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS) occurs when a Direct Clearer is unable to settle its final obligation.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): C, C1, C15, G, G0, G01, G2, G3

• Capital Flows and Macroprudential Policies - A Multilateral Assessment of Effectiveness and Externalities

  Staff Working Paper 2014-31 John Beirne, Christian Friedrich

  This paper assesses the effectiveness and associated externalities that arise when macroprudential policies (MPPs) are used to manage international capital flows. Using a sample of up to 139 countries, we examine the impact of eight different MPP measures on cross-border bank flows over the period 1999-2009.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Balance of payments and components, Financial markets, International topics JEL Code(s): F, F3, F5, G, G0, G01, G1, G11

• Information, Amplification and Financial Crisis

  Staff Working Paper 2014-30 Ali Kakhbod, Toni Ahnert

  We propose a parsimonious model of information choice in a global coordination game of regime change that is used to analyze debt crises, bank runs or currency attacks. A change in the publicly available information alters the uncertainty about the behavior of other investors.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Financial stability JEL Code(s): D, D8, D83, G, G0, G01