This paper presents a model of an over-the-counter bond market in which bond dealers and cash investors arrange repurchase agreements (repos) endogenously.
We examine the relative ability of simple inflation targeting (IT) and price level targeting (PLT) monetary policy rules to minimize both inflation variability and business cycle fluctuations in Canada for shocks that have important consequences for global commodity prices.
The author describes the construction of the U.S.-dollar-denominated zero-coupon curve for the supranational asset class from 1995 to 2010. He uses yield data from a crosssection of bonds issued by AAA-rated supranational entities to fit the Svensson (1995) term-structure model.
This paper applies a static model of an interest rate corridor to the Canadian data, and estimates the aggregate demand for central-bank settlement balances in the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS).
Many predict that innovations in retail payment may render cash obsolete. We investigate this possibility in the context of recent payment innovations such as contactless-credit and stored-value cards.
We examine the evolution of the effects of monetary policy shocks on the distribution of disaggregate prices and quantities of personal consumption expenditures to assess the contribution of monetary policy to changes in U.S. inflation dynamics.
We investigate whether expectations that are not fully rational have the potential to explain the evolution of house prices and the price-to-rent ratio in the United States.
Expected returns vary when investors face time-varying investment opportunities. Long-run risk models (Bansal and Yaron 2004) and no-arbitrage affine models (Duffie, Pan, and Singleton 2000) emphasize sources of risk that are not observable to the econometrician.
The author introduces a central counterparty (CCP) into a model of a repo market. Without the CCP, there exist multiple equilibria in the model. In one of the equilibria, a repo market emerges as bond dealers and cash investors choose to arrange repos in an over-the-counter bond market.
In an investigation of banks’ loan pricing policies in the United States over the past two decades, this study finds supporting evidence for the bank risk-taking channel of monetary policy. We show that banks charge lower spreads when they lend to riskier borrowers relative to the spreads they charge on loans to safer borrowers in periods of low short-term rates compared to periods of high short-term rates.