FSRC - Financial System Research Center

• Policy Coordination in an International Payment System

  Staff Working Paper 2008-17 James Chapman

  Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Exchange rate regimes, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, F, F3, F31, F33

• On Portfolio Separation Theorems with Heterogeneous Beliefs and Attitudes towards Risk

  Staff Working Paper 2008-16 Fousseni Chabi-Yo, Eric Ghysels, Eric Renault

  The early work of Tobin (1958) showed that portfolio allocation decisions can be reduced to a two stage process: first decide the relative allocation of assets across the risky assets, and second decide how to divide total wealth between the risky assets and the safe asset. This so called twofund separation relies on special assumptions on either returns or preferences.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial markets, Market structure and pricing JEL Code(s): C, C5, C52, D, D5, D58, G, G1, G11, G12

• The Effects of a Disruption in CDSX Settlement on Activity in the LVTS: A Simulation Study

  Staff Discussion Paper 2008-7 Lana Embree, Kirby Millar

  The Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) for settling large payments, and CDSX for settling debt and equity trades, are two of the main settlement systems in Canada. They are closely linked; for example, at the end of the day the final CDSX payment obligations must settle on the Bank of Canada's books, with payments made […]

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff discussion papers Topic(s): Financial stability, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E5, E58, G, G2, G21

• A Model of Tiered Settlement Networks

  Staff Working Paper 2008-12 James Chapman, Jonathan Chiu, Miguel Molico

  This paper develops a model of settlement system to study the endogenous structure of settlement networks, and the welfare consequences of clearing agent failure. The equilibrium degree of tiering is endogenously determined by the cost structure and the information structure.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E42, E5, E58, G, G2, G21