E4 - Money and Interest Rates

• Poignée de main invisible et persistance des cycles économiques : une revue de la littérature

  Staff Working Paper 2003-40 Christian Calmès

  The author explains how self-enforcing labour contracts can enhance the performance of macroeconomic models. He exposes the benefits of using these dynamic contracts to account for some puzzling macroeconomic facts regarding the dynamics and persistence of employment, consumption and output.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Business fluctuations and cycles, Economic models JEL Code(s): E, E1, E12, E4, E49, J, J3, J30, J31, J4, J41

• Simple Monetary Policy Rules in an Open-Economy, Limited-Participation Model

  Staff Working Paper 2003-38 Scott Hendry, Wai-Ming Ho, Kevin Moran

  The authors assess the stabilization properties of simple monetary policy rules within the context of a small open-economy model constructed around the limited-participation assumption and calibrated to salient features of the Canadian economy. By relying on limited participation as the main nominal friction that affects the artificial economy, the authors provide an important check of the robustness of the results obtained using alternative environments in the literature on monetary policy rules, most notably the now-standard "New Keynesian" paradigm that emphasizes rigidities in the price-setting mechanism.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, E5, E52, E58, F, F3, F31

• Excess Collateral in the LVTS: How Much is Too Much?

  Staff Working Paper 2003-36 Kim McPhail, Anastasia Vakos

  The authors build a theoretical model that generates demand for collateral by Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) participants under the assumption that they minimize the cost of holding and managing collateral for LVTS purposes. The model predicts that the optimal amount of collateral held by each LVTS participant depends on the opportunity cost of collateral, the transactions costs of acquiring assets used as collateral and transferring them in and out of the LVTS, and the distribution of an LVTS participant's payment flows in the LVTS.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, G, G2, G21

• Bank Lending, Credit Shocks, and the Transmission of Canadian Monetary Policy

  Staff Working Paper 2003-9 Joseph Atta-Mensah, Ali Dib

  The authors use a dynamic general-equilibrium model to study the role financial frictions play as a transmission mechanism of Canadian monetary policy, and to evaluate the real effects of exogenous credit shocks. Financial frictions, which are modelled as spreads between deposit and loan interest rates, are assumed to depend on economic activity as well as on credit shocks.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Monetary policy framework, Monetary policy transmission JEL Code(s): E, E3, E32, E4, E5, E51

• Managing Operational Risk in Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems

  Staff Working Paper 2003-2 Kim McPhail

  Awareness of operational risk has increased greatly in recent years, both at individual financial institutions and for payment, clearing, and settlement systems (PCSS). PCSS consist of networks of interconnected elements (i.e., central operators, participants, and settlement agents); operational problems at any one of the key elements have the potential to disrupt the system as a whole and negatively affect financial stability.

  Content Type(s): Staff research, Staff working papers Topic(s): Financial institutions, Payment clearing and settlement systems JEL Code(s): E, E4, E44, G, G2, G21